Iterated Regret Minimization: A New Solution Concept
Proceedings of the Twenty-First International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence. Pages 153-157.
Abstract
For some well-known games, such as the Traveler's Dilemma or the Centipede Game, traditional game-theoretic solution concepts — most notably Nash equilibrium — predict outcomes that are not consistent with empirical observations. We introduce a new solution concept, <em>iterated regret minimization,</em> which exhibits the same qualitative behavior as that observed in experiments in many games of interest, including Traveler's Dilemma, the Centipede Game, Nash bargaining, and Bertrand competition. As the name suggests, iterated regret minimization involves the iterated deletion of strategies that do not minimize regret.Joseph Y. Halpern, Rafael Pass
@inproceedings{ijcai2009p36,
title = {Iterated Regret Minimization: A New Solution Concept},
author = {Halpern, Joseph Y. and Pass, Rafael},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the Twenty-First International Joint Conference on
Artificial Intelligence, {IJCAI-09}},
publisher = {International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence},
editor = {Hiroaki Kitano},
pages = {153--157},
year = {2009},
url = {https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2009/36},
}
TY - CPAPER TI - Iterated Regret Minimization: A New Solution Concept AU - Halpern, Joseph Y. AU - Pass, Rafael T2 - Proceedings of the Twenty-First International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI-09 PB - International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence PY - 2009 SP - 153 EP - 157 UR - https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2009/36 ER -Copied
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