Characterizing Solution Concepts in Games Using Knowledge-Based Programs
Proceedings of the Twentieth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence. Pages 1300-1306.
Abstract
We show how solution concepts in games such as Nash equilibrium, correlated equilibrium, rationalizability, and sequential equilibrium can be given a uniform definition in terms of knowledge-based programs. Intuitively, all solution concepts are implementations of two knowledge-based programs, one appropriate for games represented in normal form, the other for games represented in extensive form. These knowledge-based programs can be viewed as embodying rationality. The representation works even if (a) information sets do not capture an agent's knowledge, (b) uncertainty is not represented by probability, or (c) the underlying game is not common knowledge.
@inproceedings{ijcai2007p210,
title = {Characterizing Solution Concepts in Games Using Knowledge-Based Programs},
author = {Halpern, Joseph Y. and Moses, Yoram},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the Twentieth International Joint Conference on
Artificial Intelligence, {IJCAI-07}},
publisher = {International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence},
editor = {Ramon López de Mántaras},
pages = {1300--1306},
year = {2007},
url = {https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2007/210},
}
TY - CPAPER TI - Characterizing Solution Concepts in Games Using Knowledge-Based Programs AU - Halpern, Joseph Y. AU - Moses, Yoram T2 - Proceedings of the Twentieth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI-07 PB - International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence PY - 2007 SP - 1300 EP - 1306 UR - https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2007/210 ER -Copied
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