Complexity of Pure Equilibria in Bayesian Games
Proceedings of the Twentieth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence. Pages 1294-1298.
Abstract
In this paper we make a comprehensive study of the complexity of the problem of deciding the existence of equilibria in strategic games with incomplete information, in case of pure strategies. In particular, we show that this is NP-complete in general Bayesian Games in Standard Normal Form, and that it becomes PP-hard (and, in fixed-precision scenarios, PP-complete), when the game is represented succinctly in General Normal Form. Suitable restrictions in case of graphical games that make the problem tractable are also discussed.
@inproceedings{ijcai2007p209,
title = {Complexity of Pure Equilibria in Bayesian Games},
author = {Gottlob, Georg and Greco, Gianluigi and Mancini, Toni},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the Twentieth International Joint Conference on
Artificial Intelligence, {IJCAI-07}},
publisher = {International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence},
editor = {Ramon López de Mántaras},
pages = {1294--1298},
year = {2007},
url = {https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2007/209},
}
TY - CPAPER TI - Complexity of Pure Equilibria in Bayesian Games AU - Gottlob, Georg AU - Greco, Gianluigi AU - Mancini, Toni T2 - Proceedings of the Twentieth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI-07 PB - International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence PY - 2007 SP - 1294 EP - 1298 UR - https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2007/209 ER -Copied
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