Belief as Defeasible Knowledge
Proceedings of the Eleventh International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence. Knowledge Representation. Pages 1168-1172.
Abstract
We investigate the relation between the notions of knowledge and belief. Contrary to the wellknown slogan about knowledge being ''justified, true belief," we propose that belief be viewed as defeasible knowledge. Specifically, we offer a definition of belief as knowledge-relative-toassumptions , and tie the definition to the notion of nonmonotonicity. Our definition has several advantages. First, it is short . Second, we do not need to add anything to the logic of knowledge: the right properties of belief fall out of the definition and the properties of knowledge. Third , the connection between knowledge and belief is der ived from one fundamental principle, which is more enlightening than a collection of arbitrary-seeming axioms relating the two notions.
@inproceedings{ijcai1989p187,
title = {Belief as Defeasible Knowledge},
author = {Shoham, Yoav and Moses, Yoram},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the Eleventh International Joint Conference on
Artificial Intelligence, {IJCAI-89}},
publisher = {International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence},
editor = {N. S. Sridharan},
pages = {1168--1172},
year = {1989},
month = {8},
note = {Knowledge Representation},
url = {https://ijcai.org/proceedings/1989/187},
}
TY - CPAPER TI - Belief as Defeasible Knowledge AU - Shoham, Yoav AU - Moses, Yoram T2 - Proceedings of the Eleventh International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI-89 PB - International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence PY - 1989 SP - 1168 EP - 1172 UR - https://ijcai.org/proceedings/1989/187 ER -Copied
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