Philosophical And Psychological Problems Of Artificial Intelligence

PHILOSOPHICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PROBLEMS OP ARTIPICIAL INTELLIGENCE

O.K. Tikhomirov Institute of Ps,ychology USSR Acade~ of Sciences, 37-a

Vavilov St., 117312 Moscow

The paper presents discussion of in­ terrelation between human intelligence and computer functioning. Differences are demonstrated between heuristic search of artificial intelligence and human intel­ ligence activity. "Machinocentrism" as a trend of comaring human and machine func­ tions is strongly criticised. Three prog­ rams of artificial intelligence develop­ ment are analysed. It is demonstrated that the goal of approximation to human intelligence is being set under condi­ tions of either disregarding or restrict­ ed use of ps,ychological data about human intelligence. A real recreation of human intelligence in the work of computer is being associated with simulation of needs, emotional regulation of search, goal-for­ mation, selective reflection of the si­ tuation. It is stated that representation of man and his intelligence as "just a machine" makes up the basis of the speci­ fic form of natural-scientific materia­ lism which is being developed in bounds of artificial intelligence as a scientific trend. Psychological problems arizing in connection with origin ans use of artifi­ cial intelligence are also formulated.

Analysis of theoretical principales of artificial intelligence as a scienti­ fic trend obtains critical importance. Comparison of human intellect and machine functioning, exposure of their similari­ ties and differences is one of the most significant approaches to this trend ana­ lysis. Yet this analysis would be impos­ sible w1 thout addressing philosophy and psychology - the sciences that have been traditionally studying human intellect.

Machine realization of such games as chess and checkers is often mentioned as a cogent indicator of machine intellect existence, Psychology obtains data, that one and the same problem may be solved by man and computer using different prin­ ciples and that similarity of formal re­ sults estranged (written or typed) from the solving s.ystem can not serve as a ba­ sis tor "diagnosing" that computer has human intelligence (1).

Between the heuristic search analys­ ed in the theor,y of artificial intelli­ gence on the one hand and human intellect activity on the other there are important differences which should not be ignored.

The first difference is connected with the fact that the so called heuris­ tic search is described in artificial in­ telligence works in relation to the prob~ lema having precisely defined initial si­ tuation and precisely defined goal, while it is characteristic of man to form goals and to distinguish initial and subsequent search situations. Broadly admitted is the opinion that artificial intelligence investigations have not yet developed a universal method for sophisticated formu­ lation of problems.

The second difference is connected with the nature of "operators" transform­ ing one situation into another". In human intellectual activity this "transforma­ tion" may have qualitatively different psychological structure being realized by a goalful action, by an impulsive action or by a consolidated skill. It is also si­ gnificant to differ two types of "opera­ tors" practical behavioural acts (drawing near and moving off, manipulations etc.) and gnostic or investigation acts (exami­ nation, observation of relations in the situation, implementation of its proper­ ties before realization of practical acts) "Operators" of the second type are usual­ ly ignored in artificial intelligence works.

The third difference concerne "sta­ tes". When describing "states" man uses not only such forms as lines of 8,Ymbols, vectors, two-dimensional arrays, trees and lists, but also images, meanings end senses, the most important peculiarity of which is their object relatedness. Apart from the space of "problem states" a human being also has a space of states of himself as of a subject solving the problem and it is not irrelevant to the problem-solving activity.

The forth difference consists in the fact the so called "heuristic search methods" of human intelligence and of ar­ tificial one are different by nature. Hu­ man "intensification of search" depends not only on "specific information about the problem" but also on the motives of problem~solving activity, on the ps.ycho­ logical state of the solver, on his at­ titude and so on. Generally speaking it depends on the subject. Thus there are also subjective factors that "assist in finding the solution". It is characteria· tic of man to regulate his search not on­ ly by s.yntactic and semantic rules, but rather by sense factors. It is not only the execution of evaluation functions that takes place in human intellectual activity - in the course of problem-solv­ ing there also accurs their formation. These "evaluation functions" say also be different by nature (emotional and ver­ bal evaluations, generalized and situa­ tive ones).

Even this enumeration shows that ps.ychology analyses a wider range of the problem than the so called theory of heu­ ristic search does. Furthermore it is ne­ cessary to point out that "restricted count" is rather freely interpreted here as "heuristic" in the meaning of "favour­ ing discovery", for "discovery" is inter­ preted as a solution of any problem by a mode shorter than complete count. Among the thins that do "favour discovery" in human intellectual activity the most im­ portant ones are not mentioned as a rule. Thus for instance the state of maximum mobilization of ps,ychic activity named "inspiration" is ignored.

Enumerated differences are impor­ tant in evaluating significance of arti­ ficial intelligence works and show that perfection of heuristic search in arti­ ficial intelligence may be unrelated to any significant approximation to human intelligence structure.

"Artificial intelligence· is a ra­ pidly developing trend. Therefore fore­ cast of its development and validity eva­ luation of these forecasts gains more and more importance. Ps,ychology also contri­ butes to solution of these problems.

Approximation of machine problem-sol­ ving methods to human ones is often pro­ nounced as a strategic goal in the field of artificial intelligence.

In an attempt to achieve this goal many authors resort to comparison of hu­ man intelligence and computer potentials. Yet this comparison frequently suffers from downright one-sidedness. One of the most typical cases here is evaluation of man from, so to say, "machine view-point" ("machinocentrism"). It means that first of all only those characteristics of man are pointed out that are obtained by a machine. The further analysis considers here only the degrees to which these cha­ racteristics are represented in human beings. Thus "rapidness" "working memory" "arithmetical problems' solution" and "speed and accuracy of information input and storage" are being discussed. Accord­ ing to th:f.s approach the group of human characteristics which is not represented in machines remains out of the analysis' the group includes needs, motives, goal~ formation, emotional regulation of acti­ vity.

Strongly restricted enumeration of differences results in a rather dering conclusion that neither of the mentioned differences is in principle insuperable (2) in approximating machine potentials to human intelligence; after this the conclusion is made that there are quite fair chances to build a machine cleverer than a man and at last it is stated, that in case we are able to construct a machi­ ne cleverer than ourselves, it will be able in its turn to project a still cle­ verer one. We should bare in mind anyhow that the most important differences have just not been encluded in the list of the "in principle insuperable" ones.

Pull accounting of human intellectu­ al activity peculiarities is also needed for a more precise evaluation of "machine" characteristics. Thus it is necessary for example to restrict the habitually menti­ oned machine advantage of "rapidness" for it is valid o~y for "routine" work.lhen dealing with creative work, that is the one including the processes of goal and intention formation, we may say that no matter how long this work is carried out by man, it is carried out "quicker" then by machine, for it is not able to carry out this work at all.

Even in case scientists underline advantages of man over machine, P,uman in­ telligence is often approached by them unilaterally. Thus among obvious human advantages the "volume of parallel infor­ mation handling" is often mentioned, yet being abstracted from such important cha­ racteristic of the activity as its reali­ zation by not only parallel but also qua­ litatively heterogeneous processes. Inter­ action of concious and unconcious compo­ nents in the structure of human intellec~ tual activity may serve here as an examp­ le. Furthermore this position is someti­ mes reduced to only quantitative charac­ teristics, that is to indication that brain possesses a considerably greater quantity of solving elements related by a huge number of interconnections.

Sometimes papers mention such pecu­ liarities of human activity as "selec­ tion of essential data", "retrieval of essential information", yet do so wi­ thout any refernces to the fact that hu­ man information "essentiality· is deter­ mined by relation of the information to the individual 1 s needs which may change in the course of one concrete problem - solving. There is also an opinion expres­ sed according to which the obvious fact that an organism has needs is although not denied but considered as something outer in relation to behaviour organiza­ tion. As for psychology, "mental energy" (Spearman) is sometimes pronounced to be a "general factor" of mental endowments and "mental activity".- "need in activi­ ty" is considered as its main component (3). These components and factors are interpreted here not as something outer in relation to the activity, but as a most essential constituent of human in­ tellectual activity. As it has been shown by experimental investigations,the need is connected not only with final goal statement, but also with problem­ solving, with organization of the search per se.

Three programs of artificial intel­ ligence developments may be pointed out as pithy. The first one states that the increase of memory volume and of inter­ relations between its elements would lead to the development ofmachine crea­ tive potentials. This opinion is open to criticism for cases are known when the increase of human memory volume and of interrelations between its elements did not at all lead to the increase of hie creativity (4). Therefore this condition may not be approched as the most impor­ tant one.

The second program declares the highest importance of finding out know~ ledge and concept s,ystems used by a human in solving a certain class of prob­ lems with their further introduction in­ to machine (transference of "semantic in­ formation")· In this context knowledge is understood as an ability to answer questions. If a system answers a questi­ on, it obtains knowledge. This is the eo called empirical definition of knowledge. The method of finding out knowledge need­ ed by man in solving a certain class of problems, which is usually used by arti­ ficial intelligence specialiete,coneists in self-observation in the process of learning by themselves.

To evaluate this program it is ne­ cessary to take into account the fact that for very long psychology differs formal and comprehended (meaningful) knowledge.

In the bound of art~ficial intelli­ gence knowledge gets formalistic inter­ pretation and thus bears only superfici­ al resemblance to genuine human know­ ledge.

The method used by artificial intel­ ligence specialists in finding out human knowledge (observation of learning by themselves processes) used in the course of problem-solving is strongly limitted. The thing is that in any human action there take place concious and unconcious components including generalizations.

The third program of artificial in­ telligence development accentuates the simulation of human "heuristics" yet in doing eo it ignores the above mentioned differences between machine and human heuristic methode.

Therefore we may point out a very essential peculiarity of artificial in­ telligence as a scientific trend: its strategic goal - approximation to human intelligence - is set by either neglect­ ing or restricted use of psychological data about human intelligence.

On the basis of psychological ana­ lysis applied to comparison of human and artificial intelligence we may state that the three described programs of artifici­ al intelligence development suggest modi­ fication (alteration) of the characteris­ tics which in human intelligence should be qualified as "outer quality" ("incre­ ase of memory volume, of interconnections between its elements; increase of formal knowledge volume; increase of formal me­ thods of search reduction"). If strate­ gic goal of artificial intelligence as a scientific trend - recreation of human intellectual activity methods - does not become senseless in this absolutely real situation, then we should speak about new, that is the fourth program of arti­ ficial intelligence development. The point of it is to attempt to simulate needs, emotional regulation of search, goalformation, selective reflection of the situation.

The frequently declared thesis that at present there is no theoretical limit of intelligence degree that can be ever achieved by a machine should be essenti­ ally amended: if the fourth program of artificial intelligence development is in question the point at present issue should be not presence or absence of li­ mit~ i. ... t.u.e implementation of the .t'rog­ r?~, but the very possibility to start its realization, i.e. embodiment of inner essential characteristics of human intel­ ligence in the work of a computer.

"Emancipation" of works of artifici­ al intelligence from psychology of intel­ ligence revealed in the course of our comparative analysis does not restrict progress in the field of hard- and soft­ ware developments, yet it sets a rather significant limit in possible interpreta­ tions of gained practical results in their relation to human intelligence.

The question of human and artificial intelligence interrelation is discussed by many authors in the context of philo­ sophical problems. There are direct attempts to relate identification of human and artificial intelligence to materia­ Ham. In this light the . analysis of what materialism namely is advocated by en­ thusiasts in the field of artificial in­ telligence gains principal importance.

It is well known that there exist different forma of materialism (as well as of idealism). The pre-Marx materia­ lism is usually chara~terized by the at­ tribute "mechanistic" "metaphysical" and "vulgar": words with meanings only part­ ly intersected. To characterize some forms of materialism the concept of "na­ tural-scientific materialism" is used. The term "mechanistic" has two meanings - specific and a more general ones. The first is related to the form of materia­ lism connected with classic mechanics, the latter - to any method of "reducing" complex phenomenon to ita more simple constituents. Representation of man and hie intellect as "just a machine" serves the basis for the particular form of na­ tural-scientific materialism which is being developed in bounds of artificial intelligence as a scientific trend. This materialism is mechanistic in the above mentioned broader meaning of the word, yet on the other hand it is a new form of mechanism for not the laws of mecha­ nics, but the laws of "information hand­ ling" are taken here as central. In other words it is the particular form of me­ chanism that is being changed but not its main principle.

One of the central theses of dia­ lectical materialism is the qualitative peculiarity of different movement forms of the matter; antireductionalism is characteristic of it. The ~ternative "either machine or soul .. should be reso­ lutely rejected for it contradicts the essence of dialectics. Neither "machine" nor "soul" but p~chic as a qualitative­ ly peculiar phenomenon originated at a certain stage of matter development and bearing new characteristics in relation to the matter which has not yet passed this stage of development. Concrete ps.y­ chological investigations demonstrating qualitative peculiarity of human intel­ lect in comparison with the fUnctioning of existing and practicably projected computers prove and enrich dialectical materialism.

The term "artificial intelligence· applied to computer functioning is no mo­ re than a metaphor analogous to word com­ binations "artifici8.1 hand" and "artifi­ cial eye" applied to mechanical manipula­ tors and T.V. cameras realizing the fUnc­ tion of tracing. The difference between natural and artificial hand, as well as between natural and artificial eye is aelfeviu'-n~ and does not raise Keen dis­ cussions, yet th& difference between ar­ tificial and human intelligence is not obvious for many scientists and some­ times is deliberately minimized. There­ fore we should take into account the dan­ ger of "literalism in understanding the metaphor".

Instead of mechanical borrowing of concepts and methods from artificial in­ telligence p~chology should concentrate on a more intense development of its oWn problems arising in connection with ori­ gination and use of artificial intelli­ gence. These problems include analysis of artificial intelligence use influence on human intellect, analysis of ps.ycholo­ gical after-effects of computerization (5). Talks about intellect augmenters are not usually supplied w1 th real analy­ sis of p~chological after-effects of these "augmentere'" use in human activi­ ty.

Approaching artificial intelligence as a tool of human activity it is neces­ sary to bear in mind that it gives "aug­ mentation" only in potential and that the opposite potential - that is of "weaken­ ing" - does not automatically fall away;

what is more, it comes into reality un­ der poor organization of computers' use. Furthermore the tool itself may be diffe­ rent (type of the machine, type of the program, type of the communication vdth the machine) which lead to qualitatively different variants of "augmentation".We should also take into account that human intellect may 1be rather different and hence wisdom and stupidity, intellect of a scientist and intellect of an astrolo~ ger would be augmented. Artificial intel­ ligence "augments" not all components of human intellect, but only the "machine­ like" ones, making first of all their "allies" out of them. Therefore we should speak not about just an intellect augmentatin but rather about its etruc~ ture transformation (6). Intellect aug­ mentation should be approached in a broader context of mental development. The computer frequently appears to be not just a tool of some abstract intel­ lect, but a tool of real personalities striving for self-assertion using means of high prestige range. Activity motives of personality may be both socially va­ lid and egoistic.

Effectiveness increase of artifici­ al intelligence use by means of consi­ dering peculiarities of human creative activity makes up a separate scientific pr~blem. Not only cybertetics but also psychology makes up the theoretical ba· sis of mental labour automatization. Effective use of psychological science in solution of actual problems of tech­ nological progress is to be associated not with its "technologization" and "en­ gineerization" but on the contrary with its "psychologization". The problem of "coordination" of man and machine chara­ cteristics is often met in technological literature. We would like to stress the scantiness of the way the problem is put and also the illegality of identifying this problem \rlth the problem of optimization of human activity cond.itions."Op­ timization" of activity conditions is often achieved by "discoordination" of man and machine characteristics - for example by setting conditions of free work rythm or of free access to the ma­ chine. Extention of human creative po­ tentials is one of psychological indica­ tors of artificial intelligence use ef­ fectiveness. The thesis of human thin­ king peculiarity in comparison with com­ puter information handling is the metho­ dological principle of the automatic sys­ tems' projecting theory (7).

And, finally, perspective is the problem of artificial intelligence use in the investigation of the human one (computerization of psychological expe­ riments).

We think that between the science of psychology and artificial intelli­ gence as a scientific trend should be set new relations. Artificial intelli­ gence should to a greater degree take in­ to account data of psychological science in evaluation of its practical achieve­ ments, in the works of computer develop­ ment perspective programs, in increas­ ing effectiveness of computer use. An actual problem of psychology is critical assimilation on the ground of dialecti­ cal materialism of the processes connect­ ed with the development new natural­ scientific materialism form represented by artificial intelligence theorists and thus the further development of concept apparatus allowing to reflect the speci­ ficity of p_,c~c activity regularities.