A Model of the Common-Sense Theory of Intention and Personal Causation
Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence. Psychology and A.I. Pages 465-470.
Abstract
Certain general properties of man's ability to interpret the actions of other persons are discussed. Some distinguishing features of this common-sense theory include the nature of the modal operators of Can and Try, the asymmetry of implication, and the capacity to embed models within models. The structure of a proposed model of this naive theory of personal causation is presented. This model arrives at a specific interpretation of another's actions by showing that these actions represent a possible path to a particular goal that is consistent with the axioms of the belief system's theory of human motivation and personality organization.
@inproceedings{ijcai1973p59,
title = {A Model of the Common-Sense Theory of Intention and Personal Causation},
author = {Schmidt, Charles F. and D'Addamio, John},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on
Artificial Intelligence, {IJCAI-73}},
publisher = {International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence},
editor = {Nils J. Nilsson},
pages = {465--470},
year = {1973},
month = {8},
note = {Psychology and A.I},
url = {https://ijcai.org/proceedings/1973/59},
}
TY - CPAPER TI - A Model of the Common-Sense Theory of Intention and Personal Causation AU - Schmidt, Charles F. AU - D'Addamio, John T2 - Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI-73 PB - International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence PY - 1973 SP - 465 EP - 470 UR - https://ijcai.org/proceedings/1973/59 ER -Copied
Machine-readable versions of this paper, for tools and AI agents:
