---
title: "Integer Splittable Congestion Games with Capacitated Resources and Player-Specific Costs"
authors:
  - "Gianpiero Monaco"
  - "Raffaele Mosca"
  - "Luca Moscardelli"
doi: "10.24963/ijcai.2026/32"
url: "https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2026/32"
pdf: "https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2026/0032.pdf"
venue: "Proceedings of the Thirty-Fifth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence"
year: 2026
pages: "279-287"
track: "Main Track"
keywords:
  - "Game Theory and Economic Paradigms: Noncooperative games"
  - "Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Agent theories and models"
---

# Integer Splittable Congestion Games with Capacitated Resources and Player-Specific Costs

Gianpiero Monaco, Raffaele Mosca, Luca Moscardelli

*Proceedings of the Thirty-Fifth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence*, pages 279-287. DOI: [10.24963/ijcai.2026/32](https://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2026/32)

## Abstract

Motivated by practical allocation problems, we study integer splittable congestion games with capacitated resources and player-specific costs. In this setting, each player has an integer weight that has to be split in integer units across multiple resources, each with a capacity limiting the total assigned weight, i.e., its congestion. The latency of a resource is equal to a player-specific constant when its congestion is not greater than the capacity and becomes prohibitive, i.e., equal to ∞, once the capacity is exceeded.
We analyze the computational complexity of finding an allocation that optimizes utilitarian social welfare under two cost models (total cost and per-unit cost). Furthermore, we investigate the computation of, speed of convergence to, and efficiency of Nash equilibria.