Asymptotic Fair Division: Chores Are Easier Than Goods
Proceedings of the Thirty-Fourth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence. Main Track. Pages 3988-3995.
https://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2025/444
Keywords
- Game Theory and Economic Paradigms: GTEP: Fair division
- Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: MAS: Resource allocation
Abstract
When dividing items among agents, two of the most widely studied fairness notions are envy-freeness and proportionality. We consider a setting where m chores are allocated to n agents and the disutility of each chore for each agent is drawn from a probability distribution. We show that an envy-free allocation exists with high probability provided that m >= 2n, and moreover, m must be at least n+Theta(n) in order for the existence to hold. On the other hand, we prove that a proportional allocation is likely to exist as long as m = omega(1), and this threshold is asymptotically tight. Our results reveal a clear contrast with the allocation of goods, where a larger number of items is necessary to ensure existence for both notions.
@inproceedings{ijcai2025p444,
title = {Asymptotic Fair Division: Chores Are Easier Than Goods},
author = {Manurangsi, Pasin and Suksompong, Warut},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the Thirty-Fourth International Joint Conference on
Artificial Intelligence, {IJCAI-25}},
publisher = {International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization},
editor = {James Kwok},
pages = {3988--3995},
year = {2025},
month = {8},
note = {Main Track},
doi = {10.24963/ijcai.2025/444},
url = {https://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2025/444},
}
TY - CPAPER TI - Asymptotic Fair Division: Chores Are Easier Than Goods AU - Manurangsi, Pasin AU - Suksompong, Warut T2 - Proceedings of the Thirty-Fourth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI-25 PB - International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization PY - 2025 SP - 3988 EP - 3995 DO - 10.24963/ijcai.2025/444 UR - https://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2025/444 ER -Copied
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