{"type":"ScholarlyArticle","title":"Two-Sided Facility Location Games","authors":[{"name":"Simon Krogmann","slug":"simon-krogmann","given":"Simon","family":"Krogmann","affiliation":"Hasso Plattner Institute , University of Potsdam"}],"abstract":"Facility location problems have been studied in settings like hospital placement or the competition between stores.\r\nIn some cases, a central authority coordinates facility placements to optimize metrics like the coverage of an area or emergency response time.\r\nIn many cases, however, facilities are placed by multiple rational agents to maximize their utility, e.g., the number of clients they attract.\r\nIn previous research, these games feature simplistic client behavior independent of other clients' strategic choices, e.g., visiting the closest facility.\r\nOur goal is to understand what happens if clients also act selfishly, resulting in a two-stage game consisting of strategic facility and client agents.\r\n\r\nIn three recent publications, we investigated such two-stage models for clients that optimize their waiting times.\r\nWe showed the existence and gave algorithms for (approximate) subgame perfect equilibria, a common extension of Nash equilibria for sequential games.\r\nTo learn more about this domain, we intend to investigate further natural client behaviors and eventually create a more general model or hierarchy of two-sided facility location games.\r\nWith this, we aim to make predictions in real-world settings, e.g., the placement of renewable energy infrastructure.","doi":"10.24963/ijcai.2024/963","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2024/963","pdf":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2024/0963.pdf","markdown":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2024/963.md","bibtex":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2024/bibtex/963","volume":{"slug":"2024","title":"Proceedings of the Thirty-Third International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence","short_title":"IJCAI 2024","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2024/","year":2024,"location":"Jeju, Korea","dates":"3-9 August 2024","editors":"Kate Larson","isbn":"978-1-956792-04-1","publisher":"International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization","doi_prefix":"10.24963/ijcai.2024"},"section":"Doctoral Consortium","track":"Doctoral Consortium","number":963,"pages":{"first":8496,"last":8497},"keywords":["DC: Game Theory and Economic Paradigms"],"videos":[],"references":[{"position":1,"raw":"[Downs, 1957] Anthony Downs. 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In AAAI, vol- ume 37, pages 5714-5721, 2023.","title":"Strategic facility location with clients that minimize total waiting time","authors":"Simon Krogmann, Pascal Lenzner, Alexander Skopalik","year":"2023","venue":"AAAI","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":9,"raw":"[Krogmann et al., 2024] Simon Krogmann, Pascal Lenzner, Alexander Skopalik, Marc Uetz, and Marnix C. Vos. Equi- libria in two-stage facility location with atomic clients. In IJCAI, 2024.","title":"Equilibria in two-stage facility location with atomic clients","authors":"Simon Krogmann, Pascal Lenzner, Alexander Skopalik, Marc Uetz, Marnix C Vos","year":"2024","venue":"IJCAI","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":"/proceedings/2024/315"}],"license_note":"Copyright International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence."}