{"type":"ScholarlyArticle","title":"Budget Feasible Mechanisms: A Survey","authors":[{"name":"Xiang Liu","slug":"xiang-liu","given":"Xiang","family":"Liu","affiliation":"Southeast University , Nanjing , China"},{"name":"Hau Chan","slug":"hau-chan","given":"Hau","family":"Chan","affiliation":"University of Nebraska-Lincoln , Nebraska , USA"},{"name":"Minming Li","slug":"minming-li","given":"Minming","family":"Li","affiliation":"City University of Hong Kong , Hong Kong SAR , China"},{"name":"Weiwei Wu","slug":"weiwei-wu","given":"Weiwei","family":"Wu","affiliation":"Southeast University , Nanjing , China"}],"abstract":"In recent decades, the design of budget feasible mechanisms for a wide range of procurement auction settings has received significant attention in the Artificial Intelligence (AI) community. \r\nThese procurement auction settings have practical applications in various domains such as federated learning, crowdsensing, edge computing, and resource allocation. In a basic procurement auction setting of these domains, a buyer with a limited budget is tasked with procuring items (\\eg, goods or services) from strategic sellers, who have private information on the true costs of their items and incentives to misrepresent their items' true costs. \r\nThe primary goal of budget feasible mechanisms is to elicit the true costs from  sellers and determine items to procure from sellers to maximize the buyer valuation function for the items and ensure that the total payment to the sellers is no more than the budget. In this survey, we provide a comprehensive overview of key procurement auction settings and results of budget feasible mechanisms. We provide several promising future research directions.","doi":"10.24963/ijcai.2024/899","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2024/899","pdf":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2024/0899.pdf","markdown":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2024/899.md","bibtex":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2024/bibtex/899","volume":{"slug":"2024","title":"Proceedings of the Thirty-Third International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence","short_title":"IJCAI 2024","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2024/","year":2024,"location":"Jeju, Korea","dates":"3-9 August 2024","editors":"Kate Larson","isbn":"978-1-956792-04-1","publisher":"International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization","doi_prefix":"10.24963/ijcai.2024"},"section":"Survey Track","track":"Survey Track","number":899,"pages":{"first":8132,"last":8141},"keywords":["Game Theory and Economic Paradigms: GTEP: Auctions and market-based systems","Game Theory and Economic Paradigms: GTEP: Mechanism design"],"videos":[],"references":[{"position":1,"raw":"[Aggarwal and Hartline, 2006] Gagan Aggarwal and Ja- son D Hartline. 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