Optimizing Prosumer Policies in Periodic Double Auctions Inspired by Equilibrium Analysis

Optimizing Prosumer Policies in Periodic Double Auctions Inspired by Equilibrium Analysis

Bharat Manvi, Sanjay Chandlekar, Easwar Subramanian

Proceedings of the Thirty-Third International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Main Track. Pages 2931-2939. https://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2024/325

We consider a periodic double auction (PDA) wherein the main participants are wholesale suppliers and brokers representing retailers. The suppliers are represented by a composite supply curve and the brokers are represented by individual bids. Additionally, the brokers can also participate in small-scale selling by placing individual asks; hence, they act as prosumers. Specifically, in a PDA, the prosumers who are net buyers have multiple opportunities to buy or sell multiple units of a commodity with the aim of minimising the cost of buying across multiple rounds of the PDA. Formulating optimal bidding strategies for such a PDA setting involves planning across current and future rounds while taking into account the bidding strategies of other agents. In this work, we propose Markov perfect Nash equilibrium (MPNE) policies for a setup where multiple prosumers with knowledge of the composite supply curve compete to procure commodities. Thereafter, the MPNE policies are used to develop an algorithm called MPNE-BBS for the case wherein the prosumers need to re-construct an approximate composite supply curve using past auction information. The efficacy of the proposed algorithm is demonstrated on the PowerTAC wholesale market simulator against several baselines and state-of-the-art bidding policies.
Keywords:
Game Theory and Economic Paradigms: GTEP: Auctions and market-based systems
Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: MAS: Agent theories and models
Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: MAS: Agent-based simulation and emergence
Game Theory and Economic Paradigms: GTEP: Noncooperative games