{"type":"ScholarlyArticle","title":"Combinatorial Games with Incomplete Information","authors":[{"name":"Junkang Li","slug":"junkang-li","given":"Junkang","family":"Li","affiliation":"NukkAI , Paris , France; Normandie Univ. ; UNICAEN , ENSICAEN , CNRS , GREYC , 14 000 Caen , France"},{"name":"Bruno Zanuttini","slug":"bruno-zanuttini","given":"Bruno","family":"Zanuttini","affiliation":"Normandie Univ. ; UNICAEN , ENSICAEN , CNRS , GREYC , 14 000 Caen , France"},{"name":"Véronique Ventos","slug":"veronique-ventos","given":"Véronique","family":"Ventos","affiliation":"NukkAI , Paris , France"}],"abstract":"Games with incomplete information model multi-agent interaction in which players do not have common knowledge of the game they play. We propose a minimal generalisation of combinatorial games to incorporate incomplete information, called combinatorial game with incomplete information (CGII). The most important feature of CGIIs is that all actions are public, which allows better visualisation of each player's knowledge and incomplete information. To further motivate the study of this new formalism, we show that computing optimal strategies for CGIIs has the same computational complexity as for general extensive-form games.","doi":"10.24963/ijcai.2024/321","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2024/321","pdf":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2024/0321.pdf","markdown":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2024/321.md","bibtex":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2024/bibtex/321","volume":{"slug":"2024","title":"Proceedings of the Thirty-Third International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence","short_title":"IJCAI 2024","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2024/","year":2024,"location":"Jeju, Korea","dates":"3-9 August 2024","editors":"Kate Larson","isbn":"978-1-956792-04-1","publisher":"International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization","doi_prefix":"10.24963/ijcai.2024"},"section":"Game Theory and Economic Paradigms","track":"Main Track","number":321,"pages":{"first":2895,"last":2903},"keywords":["Game Theory and Economic Paradigms: GTEP: Noncooperative games","Uncertainty in AI: UAI: Sequential decision making"],"videos":[],"references":[{"position":1,"raw":"[Albert and Nowakowski, 2009] Michael H. 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