{"type":"ScholarlyArticle","title":"Vulnerabilities of Single-Round Incentive Compatibility in Auto-bidding: Theory and Evidence from ROI-Constrained Online Advertising Markets","authors":[{"name":"Juncheng Li","slug":"juncheng-li","given":"Juncheng","family":"Li","affiliation":"Tsinghua University"},{"name":"Pingzhong Tang","slug":"pingzhong-tang","given":"Pingzhong","family":"Tang","affiliation":"Tsinghua University"}],"abstract":"Most of the work in the auction design literature assumes that bidders behave rationally based on the information available for every individual auction, and the revelation principle enables designers to restrict their efforts to incentive compatible (IC) mechanisms. However, in today’s online advertising markets, one of the most important real-life applications of auction design, the data and computational power required to bid optimally are only available to the platform, and an advertiser can only participate by setting performance objectives and constraints for its proxy auto-bidder provided by the platform. The prevalence of auto-bidding necessitates a review of auction theory. In this paper, we examine the markets through the lens of ROI-constrained value-maximizing campaigns. We show that second price auction exhibits many undesirable properties (computational hardness, non-monotonicity, instability of bidders’ utilities, and interference in A/B testing) and loses its dominant theoretical advantages in single-item scenarios. In addition, we make it clear how IC and its runner-up-winner interdependence contribute to each property. We hope that our work could bring new perspectives to the community and benefit practitioners to attain a better grasp of real-world markets.","doi":"10.24963/ijcai.2024/320","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2024/320","pdf":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2024/0320.pdf","markdown":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2024/320.md","bibtex":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2024/bibtex/320","volume":{"slug":"2024","title":"Proceedings of the Thirty-Third International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence","short_title":"IJCAI 2024","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2024/","year":2024,"location":"Jeju, Korea","dates":"3-9 August 2024","editors":"Kate Larson","isbn":"978-1-956792-04-1","publisher":"International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization","doi_prefix":"10.24963/ijcai.2024"},"section":"Game Theory and Economic Paradigms","track":"Main Track","number":320,"pages":{"first":2886,"last":2894},"keywords":["Game Theory and Economic Paradigms: GTEP: Auctions and market-based systems","Multidisciplinary Topics and Applications: MTA: Economics"],"videos":[],"references":[{"position":1,"raw":"[Aggarwal et al., 2019] Gagan Aggarwal, Ashwinkumar Badanidiyuru, and Aranyak Mehta. 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