{"type":"ScholarlyArticle","title":"Randomized Learning-Augmented Auctions with Revenue Guarantees","authors":[{"name":"Ioannis Caragiannis","slug":"ioannis-caragiannis","given":"Ioannis","family":"Caragiannis","affiliation":"Department of Computer Science , Aarhus University"},{"name":"Georgios Kalantzis","slug":"georgios-kalantzis","given":"Georgios","family":"Kalantzis","affiliation":"Department of Computer Science , Aarhus University"}],"abstract":"We consider the fundamental problem of designing a truthful single-item auction with the challenging objective of extracting a large fraction of the highest agent valuation as revenue. Following a recent trend in algorithm design, we assume that the agent valuations belong to a known interval, and a prediction for the highest valuation is available. Then, auction design aims for high consistency and robustness, meaning that, for appropriate pairs of values γ and ρ, the extracted revenue should be at least a γ- or ρ-fraction of the highest valuation when the prediction is correct for the input instance or not. We characterize all pairs of parameters γ and ρ so that a randomized γ-consistent and ρ-robust auction exists. Furthermore, for the setting in which robustness can be a function of the prediction error, we give sufficient and necessary conditions for the existence of robust auctions and present randomized auctions that extract a revenue that is only a polylogarithmic (in terms of the prediction error) factor away from the highest agent valuation.","doi":"10.24963/ijcai.2024/297","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2024/297","pdf":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2024/0297.pdf","markdown":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2024/297.md","bibtex":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2024/bibtex/297","volume":{"slug":"2024","title":"Proceedings of the Thirty-Third International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence","short_title":"IJCAI 2024","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2024/","year":2024,"location":"Jeju, Korea","dates":"3-9 August 2024","editors":"Kate Larson","isbn":"978-1-956792-04-1","publisher":"International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization","doi_prefix":"10.24963/ijcai.2024"},"section":"Game Theory and Economic Paradigms","track":"Main Track","number":297,"pages":{"first":2687,"last":2694},"keywords":["Game Theory and Economic Paradigms: GTEP: Auctions and market-based systems","Game Theory and Economic Paradigms: GTEP: Noncooperative games","Game Theory and Economic Paradigms: GTEP: Mechanism design"],"videos":[],"references":[{"position":1,"raw":"[Agrawal et al., 2022] Priyank Agrawal, Eric Balkanski, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Tingting Ou, and Xizhi Tan. 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