{"type":"ScholarlyArticle","title":"Incentive-Compatible Selection for One or Two Influentials","authors":[{"name":"Yuxin Zhao","slug":"yuxin-zhao","given":"Yuxin","family":"Zhao","affiliation":"ShanghaiTech University"},{"name":"Yao Zhang","slug":"yao-zhang","given":"Yao","family":"Zhang","affiliation":"ShanghaiTech University"},{"name":"Dengji Zhao","slug":"dengji-zhao","given":"Dengji","family":"Zhao","affiliation":"ShanghaiTech University"}],"abstract":"Selecting influentials in networks against strategic manipulations has attracted many researchers' attention and it also has many practical applications. Here, we aim to select one or two influentials in terms of progeny (the influential power) and prevent agents from manipulating their edges (incentive compatibility). The existing studies mostly focused on selecting a single influential for this setting. Zhang et al. [2021] studied the problem of selecting one agent and proved an upper bound of 1/(1+ln2) to approximate the optimal selection. In this paper, we first design a mechanism to actually reach the bound. Then, we move this forward to choosing two agents and propose a mechanism to achieve an approximation ratio of (3+ln2)/(4(1+ln2)) (approx. 0.54).","doi":"10.24963/ijcai.2023/327","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2023/327","pdf":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2023/0327.pdf","markdown":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2023/327.md","bibtex":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2023/bibtex/327","volume":{"slug":"2023","title":"Proceedings of the Thirty-Second International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence","short_title":"IJCAI 2023","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2023/","year":2023,"location":"Macao, SAR","dates":"19-25 August 2023","editors":"Edith Elkind","isbn":"978-1-956792-03-4","publisher":"International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization","doi_prefix":"10.24963/ijcai.2023"},"section":"Game Theory and Economic Paradigms","track":"Main Track","number":327,"pages":{"first":2931,"last":2938},"keywords":["Game Theory and Economic Paradigms: GTEP: Mechanism design"],"videos":[],"references":[{"position":1,"raw":"[Alon et al., 2011] Noga Alon, Felix Fischer, Ariel Procac- cia, and Moshe Tennenholtz. 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