{"type":"ScholarlyArticle","title":"Ordinal Hedonic Seat Arrangement under Restricted Preference Domains: Swap Stability and Popularity","authors":[{"name":"Anaëlle Wilczynski","slug":"anaelle-wilczynski","given":"Anaëlle","family":"Wilczynski","affiliation":""}],"abstract":"We study a variant of hedonic games, called hedonic seat arrangements in the literature, where the goal is not to partition the agents into coalitions but to assign them to vertices of a given graph; their satisfaction is then based on the subset of agents in their neighborhood. We focus on ordinal hedonic seat arrangements where the preferences over neighborhoods are deduced from ordinal preferences over single agents and a given preference extension. In such games and for different types of preference restrictions and extensions, we investigate the existence of arrangements satisfying stability w.r.t. swaps of positions in the graph or the well-known optimality concept of popularity.","doi":"10.24963/ijcai.2023/324","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2023/324","pdf":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2023/0324.pdf","markdown":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2023/324.md","bibtex":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2023/bibtex/324","volume":{"slug":"2023","title":"Proceedings of the Thirty-Second International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence","short_title":"IJCAI 2023","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2023/","year":2023,"location":"Macao, SAR","dates":"19-25 August 2023","editors":"Edith Elkind","isbn":"978-1-956792-03-4","publisher":"International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization","doi_prefix":"10.24963/ijcai.2023"},"section":"Game Theory and Economic Paradigms","track":"Main Track","number":324,"pages":{"first":2906,"last":2914},"keywords":["Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: MAS: Resource allocation","Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: MAS: Coordination and cooperation","Game Theory and Economic Paradigms: GTEP: Computational social choice"],"videos":[],"references":[{"position":1,"raw":"Azar Abizada. 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