{"type":"ScholarlyArticle","title":"Convergence in Multi-Issue Iterative Voting under Uncertainty","authors":[{"name":"Joshua Kavner","slug":"joshua-kavner","given":"Joshua","family":"Kavner","affiliation":"Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute"},{"name":"Reshef Meir","slug":"reshef-meir","given":"Reshef","family":"Meir","affiliation":"Technion Israel Institute of Technology"},{"name":"Francesca Rossi","slug":"francesca-rossi","given":"Francesca","family":"Rossi","affiliation":"IBM T.J. Watson Research Center"},{"name":"Lirong Xia","slug":"lirong-xia","given":"Lirong","family":"Xia","affiliation":"Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute"}],"abstract":"We study strategic behavior in iterative plurality voting for multiple issues under uncertainty. We introduce a model synthesizing simultaneous multi-issue voting with local dominance theory, in which agents repeatedly update their votes based on sets of vote profiles they deem possible, and determine its convergence properties. After demonstrating that local dominance improvement dynamics may fail to converge, we present two sufficient model refinements that guarantee convergence from any initial vote profile for binary issues: constraining agents to have O-legal preferences, where issues are ordered by importance, and endowing agents with less uncertainty about issues they are modifying than others. Our empirical studies demonstrate that while cycles are common for agents without uncertainty, introducing uncertainty makes convergence almost guaranteed in practice.","doi":"10.24963/ijcai.2023/310","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2023/310","pdf":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2023/0310.pdf","markdown":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2023/310.md","bibtex":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2023/bibtex/310","volume":{"slug":"2023","title":"Proceedings of the Thirty-Second International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence","short_title":"IJCAI 2023","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2023/","year":2023,"location":"Macao, SAR","dates":"19-25 August 2023","editors":"Edith Elkind","isbn":"978-1-956792-03-4","publisher":"International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization","doi_prefix":"10.24963/ijcai.2023"},"section":"Game Theory and Economic Paradigms","track":"Main Track","number":310,"pages":{"first":2783,"last":2791},"keywords":["Game Theory and Economic Paradigms: GTEP: Computational social choice"],"videos":[],"references":[{"position":1,"raw":"[Airiau and Endriss, 2009] Stéphane Airiau and Ulle En- driss. Iterated majority voting. In International Con- ference on Algorithmic Decision Theory, pages 38-49. Springer, 2009.","title":"Iterated majority voting","authors":"Stéphane Airiau, Ulle Endriss","year":"2009","venue":"International Conference on Algorithmic Decision Theory","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":2,"raw":"Krzysztof R Apt and Sunil Simon. A classification of weakly acyclic games. Theory and Deci- sion, 78(4):501-524, 2015.","title":"A classification of weakly acyclic games","authors":"R Krzysztof, Sunil Apt, Simon","year":"2015","venue":"Theory and Decision","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":3,"raw":"[Bowling, 2005] Michael Bowling. Convergence and no- regret in multiagent learning. In Proceedings of the An- nual Conference on Neural Information Processing Sys- tems (NIPS), pages 209-216, Vancouver, Canada, 2005.","title":"Convergence and noregret in multiagent learning","authors":"Michael Bowling","year":"2005","venue":"Proceedings of the Annual Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems (NIPS)","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":4,"raw":"[Bowman et al., 2014] Clark Bowman, Jonathan K Hodge, and Ada Yu. The potential of iterative voting to solve the separability problem in referendum elections. Theory and Decision, 77(1):111-124, 2014.","title":"The potential of iterative voting to solve the separability problem in referendum elections","authors":"Clark Bowman, Jonathan K Hodge, Ada Yu","year":"2014","venue":"Theory and Decision","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":5,"raw":"[Brânzei et al., 2013] Simina Brânzei, Ioannis Caragiannis, Jamie Morgenstern, and Ariel D. Procaccia. How bad is selfish voting? In Proceedings of the 27th AAAI Confer- ence on Artificial Intelligence, pages 138-144, 2013.","title":"How bad is selfish voting?","authors":"Simina Brânzei, Ioannis Caragiannis, Jamie Morgenstern, Ariel D Procaccia","year":"2013","venue":"Proceedings of the 27th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":6,"raw":"[Chopra et al., 2004] Samir Chopra, Eric Pacuit, and Rohit Parikh. Knowledge-theoretic properties of strategic vot- ing. In European Workshop on Logics in Artificial Intelli- gence, pages 18-30. Springer, 2004.","title":"Knowledge-theoretic properties of strategic voting","authors":"Samir Chopra, Eric Pacuit, Rohit Parikh","year":"2004","venue":"European Workshop on Logics in Artificial Intelligence","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":7,"raw":"[Conitzer et al., 2009] Vincent Conitzer, Jérôme Lang, and Lirong Xia. How hard is it to control sequential elections via the agenda? In Proceedings of the Twenty-First In- ternational Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJ- CAI), pages 103-108, Pasadena, CA, USA, 2009.","title":"How hard is it to control sequential elections via the agenda?","authors":"Vincent Conitzer, Jérôme Lang, Lirong Xia","year":"2009","venue":"Proceedings of the Twenty-First International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJ-CAI)","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":"/proceedings/2009/28"},{"position":8,"raw":"[Conitzer et al., 2011] Vincent Conitzer, Toby Walsh, and Lirong Xia. Dominating manipulations in voting with par- tial information. In Proceedings of the National Confer- ence on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), pages 638-643, San Francisco, CA, USA, 2011.","title":"Dominating manipulations in voting with partial information","authors":"Vincent Conitzer, Toby Walsh, Lirong Xia","year":"2011","venue":"Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI)","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":9,"raw":"[Desmedt and Elkind, 2010] Yvo Desmedt and Edith Elkind. Equilibria of plurality voting with abstentions. In Proceed- ings of the 11th ACM conference on Electronic Commerce, pages 347-356, 2010.","title":"Equilibria of plurality voting with abstentions","authors":"Elkind ; ] Yvo Desmedt, Edith Desmedt, Elkind","year":"2010","venue":"Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Electronic Commerce","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":10,"raw":"[Elkind et al., 2020] Edith Elkind, Umberto Grandi, Francesca Rossi, and Arkadii Slinko. Cognitive hier- archy and voting manipulation in k-approval voting. Mathematical Social Sciences, 108:193-205, 2020.","title":"Cognitive hierarchy and voting manipulation in k-approval voting","authors":"Elkind","year":"2020","venue":"Mathematical Social Sciences","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":11,"raw":"[Endriss et al., 2016] Ulle Endriss, Svetlana Obraztsova, Maria Polukarov, and Jeffrey S. Rosenschein. Strategic voting with incomplete information. In Proceedings of the Twenty-Fifth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI'16, page 236-242. AAAI Press, 2016. Fudenberg and Levine, 2009] Drew Fudenberg and David K Levine. Learning and equilibrium. Annu. Rev. Econ., 1(1):385-420, 2009.","title":"Strategic voting with incomplete information","authors":"Ulle Endriss, Svetlana Obraztsova, Maria Polukarov, Jeffrey S Rosenschein","year":"2009","venue":"Proceedings of the Twenty-Fifth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI'16","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":12,"raw":"[Grandi et al., 2013] Umberto Grandi, Andrea Loreggia, Francesca Rossi, Kristen Brent Venable, and Toby Walsh. Restricted manipulation in iterative voting: Condorcet ef- ficiency and Borda score. In International Conference on Algorithmic Decision Theory, pages 181-192. Springer, 2013.","title":"Restricted manipulation in iterative voting: Condorcet efficiency and Borda score","authors":"Umberto Grandi, Andrea Loreggia, Francesca Rossi, Kristen Brent Venable, Toby Walsh","year":"2013","venue":"International Conference on Algorithmic Decision Theory","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":13,"raw":"[Grandi et al., 2019] Umberto Grandi, Daniel Hughes, Francesca Rossi, and Arkadii Slinko. Gibbard- Satterthwaite games for k-approval voting rules. Mathematical Social Sciences, 99:24-35, 2019.","title":"Gibbard-Satterthwaite games for k-approval voting rules","authors":"Umberto Grandi, Daniel Hughes, Francesca Rossi, Arkadii Slinko","year":"2019","venue":"Mathematical Social Sciences","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":14,"raw":"[Grandi et al., 2022] Umberto Grandi, Jérôme Lang, Ali I Ozkes, and Stéphane Airiau. Voting behavior in one-shot and iterative multiple referenda. Social Choice and Wel- fare, pages 1-35, 2022.","title":"Voting behavior in one-shot and iterative multiple referenda","authors":"Umberto Grandi, Jérôme Lang, Ali I Ozkes, Stéphane Airiau","year":"2022","venue":"Social Choice and Welfare","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":15,"raw":"[Hodge, 2002] Jonathan K Hodge. Separable preference or- ders. PhD thesis, Western Michigan University, 2002.","title":"Separable preference orders","authors":"Jonathan K Hodge","year":"2002","venue":null,"doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":16,"raw":"[Kavner and Xia, 2021] Joshua Kavner and Lirong Xia. Strategic behavior is bliss: iterative voting improves so- cial welfare. Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems, 34:19021-19032, 2021.","title":"Strategic behavior is bliss: iterative voting improves social welfare","authors":"Xia ; Kavner, Joshua Kavner, Lirong Xia","year":"2021","venue":"Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":17,"raw":"[Koolyk et al., 2017] Aaron Koolyk, Tyrone Strangway, Omer Lev, and Jeffrey S. Rosenschein. Convergence and quality of iterative voting under non-scoring rules. In Pro- ceedings of the Twenty-Sixth International Joint Confer- ence on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI-17, pages 273-279, 2017.","title":"Convergence and quality of iterative voting under non-scoring rules","authors":"Aaron Koolyk, Tyrone Strangway, Omer Lev, Jeffrey S Rosenschein","year":"2017","venue":"Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI-17","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":"/proceedings/2017/39"},{"position":18,"raw":"[Kukushkin, 2011] Nikolai S Kukushkin. Acyclicity of im- provements in finite game forms. International Journal of Game Theory, 40(1):147-177, 2011.","title":"Acyclicity of improvements in finite game forms","authors":"Nikolai S Kukushkin","year":"2011","venue":"International Journal of Game Theory","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":19,"raw":"[Lacy and Niou, 2000] D. Lacy and E. Niou. A problem with referenda. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 12(1):5- 31, 2000.","title":"A problem with referenda","authors":"D Lacy, E Niou","year":"2000","venue":"Journal of Theoretical Politics","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":20,"raw":"[Lang and Xia, 2009] Jérôme Lang and Lirong Xia. Sequen- tial composition of voting rules in multi-issue domains. Mathematical Social Sciences, 57(3):304-324, 2009.","title":"Sequential composition of voting rules in multi-issue domains","authors":"Lang, Xia ;, Jérôme Lang, Lirong Xia","year":"2009","venue":"Mathematical Social Sciences","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":21,"raw":"[Lang and Xia, 2016] Jérôme Lang and Lirong Xia. Vot- ing in Combinatorial Domains. In Felix Brandt, Vincent Conitzer, Ulle Endriss, Jérôme Lang, and Ariel Procaccia, editors, Handbook of Computational Social Choice, chap- ter 9. Cambridge University Press, 2016.","title":"Voting in Combinatorial Domains","authors":"Lang, Xia ;, Jérôme Lang, Lirong Xia","year":"2016","venue":"Handbook of Computational Social Choice","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":22,"raw":"[Lang, 2007] Jérôme Lang. Vote and aggregation in com- binatorial domains with structured preferences. In Pro- ceedings of the Twentieth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), pages 1366-1371, Hy- derabad, India, 2007.","title":"Vote and aggregation in combinatorial domains with structured preferences","authors":"Lang ;, Jérôme Lang","year":"2007","venue":"Proceedings of the Twentieth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI)","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":"/proceedings/2007/220"},{"position":23,"raw":"[Lev and Rosenschein, 2012] Omer Lev and Jeffrey S Rosenschein. Convergence of iterative voting. In Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems-Volume 2, pages 611-618, 2012.","title":"Convergence of iterative voting","authors":"Lev, Rosenschein, Omer Lev, Jeffrey S Rosenschein","year":"2012","venue":"Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":24,"raw":"[Marden et al., 2007] Jason R. Marden, Gürdal Arslan, and Jeff S. Shamma. Regret based dynamics: Convergence in weakly acyclic games. In Proceedings of the 6th Interna- tional Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi- agent Systems, AAMAS '07, New York, NY, USA, 2007. Association for Computing Machinery.","title":"Regret based dynamics: Convergence in weakly acyclic games","authors":"Jason R Marden, Gürdal Arslan, Jeff S Shamma","year":"2007","venue":"Proceedings of the 6th International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS '07","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":25,"raw":"[Meir et al., 2010] Reshef Meir, Maria Polukarov, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein, and Nicholas R. Jennings. Convergence to Equilibria of Plurality Voting. In Proceedings of the Na- tional Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), pages 823-828, Atlanta, GA, USA, 2010.","title":"Convergence to Equilibria of Plurality Voting","authors":"Reshef Meir, Maria Polukarov, Jeffrey S Rosenschein, Nicholas R Jennings","year":"2010","venue":"Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI)","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":26,"raw":"[Meir et al., 2014] Reshef Meir, Omer Lev, and Jeffrey S. Rosenschein. A Local-Dominance Theory of Voting Equi- libria. In Proceedings of the 15th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, pages 313-330, Palo Alto, CA, USA, 2014.","title":"A Local-Dominance Theory of Voting Equilibria","authors":"Reshef Meir, Omer Lev, Jeffrey S Rosenschein","year":"2014","venue":"Proceedings of the 15th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":27,"raw":"[Meir et al., 2017] Reshef Meir, Maria Polukarov, Jeffrey S Rosenschein, and Nicholas R Jennings. Iterative voting and acyclic games. Artificial Intelligence, 252:100-122, 2017.","title":"Iterative voting and acyclic games","authors":"Reshef Meir, Maria Polukarov, Nicholas R Jeffrey S Rosenschein, Jennings","year":"2017","venue":"Artificial Intelligence","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":28,"raw":"[Meir et al., 2020] Reshef Meir, Kobi Gal, and Maor Tal. Strategic voting in the lab: compromise and leader bias behavior. Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, 34(1):1-37, 2020.","title":"Strategic voting in the lab: compromise and leader bias behavior","authors":"Reshef Meir, Kobi Gal, Maor Tal","year":"2020","venue":"Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":29,"raw":"[Meir, 2015] Reshef Meir. Plurality Voting under Uncer- tainty. In Proceedings of the 29th AAAI on Artificial In- telligence, 2015.","title":"Plurality Voting under Uncertainty","authors":"Reshef Meir","year":"2015","venue":"Proceedings of the 29th AAAI on Artificial Intelligence","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":30,"raw":"[Meir, 2018] Reshef Meir. Strategic Voting. Synthesis Lec- tures on Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning.","title":"Strategic Voting","authors":"Reshef Meir","year":null,"venue":"Synthesis Lectures on Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":31,"raw":"Morgan & Claypool, 2018.","title":null,"authors":"Claypool Morgan","year":"2018","venue":null,"doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":32,"raw":"[Milchtaich, 1996] Igal Milchtaich. Congestion games with player-specific payoff functions. Games and Economic Behavior, 13(1):111-124, 1996.","title":"Igal Milchtaich. Congestion games with player-specific payoff functions","authors":"Milchtaich","year":"1996","venue":"Games and Economic Behavior","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":33,"raw":"[Monderer and Shapley, 1996] Dov Monderer and Lloyd S. Shapley. Potential games. Games and Economic Behavior, 14(1):124-143, 1996.","title":"Potential games","authors":"Shapley Monderer, Dov Monderer, Lloyd S Shapley","year":"1996","venue":"Games and Economic Behavior","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":34,"raw":"[Myerson and Weber, 1993] Roger B Myerson and Robert J Weber. A theory of voting equilibria. American Political Science Review, 87(1):102-114, 1993.","title":"A theory of voting equilibria","authors":"B Roger, Robert J Myerson, Weber","year":"1993","venue":"American Political Science Review","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":35,"raw":"[Obraztsova et al., 2015] Svetlana Obraztsova, Evangelos Markakis, Maria Polukarov, Zinovi Rabinovich, and Nicholas R. Jennings. On the convergence of iterative vot- ing: How restrictive should restricted dynamics be? In Proceedings of the Twenty-Ninth AAAI Conference on Ar- tificial Intelligence, AAAI'15, page 993-999, 2015.","title":"On the convergence of iterative voting: How restrictive should restricted dynamics be?","authors":"Svetlana Obraztsova, Evangelos Markakis, Maria Polukarov, Zinovi Rabinovich, Nicholas R Jennings","year":"2015","venue":"Proceedings of the Twenty-Ninth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI'15","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":36,"raw":"[Rabinovich et al., 2015] Zinovi Rabinovich, Svetlana Obraztsova, Omer Lev, Evangelos Markakis, and Jeffrey Rosenschein. Analysis of equilibria in iterative voting schemes. In Proceedings of the 29th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence. AAAI Press, 2015.","title":"Analysis of equilibria in iterative voting schemes","authors":"Rabinovich","year":"2015","venue":"Proceedings of the 29th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":37,"raw":"[Reijngoud and Endriss, 2012] Annemieke Reijngoud and Ulle Endriss. Voter response to iterated poll information. In Proceedings of the Eleventh International Joint Con- ference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS), volume 1, pages 635-644, 06 2012.","title":"Voter response to iterated poll information","authors":"Endriss Reijngoud, Annemieke Reijngoud, Ulle Endriss","year":"2012","venue":"Proceedings of the Eleventh International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS)","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":38,"raw":"[Reyhani and Wilson, 2012] Reyhaneh Reyhani and Mark C. Wilson. Best reply dynamics for scoring rules. In Proceed- ings of the 20th European Conference on Artificial Intelli- gence, ECAI'12, page 672-677, NLD, 2012. IOS Press.","title":"Reyhaneh Reyhani and Mark C. Wilson. Best reply dynamics for scoring rules","authors":"Wilson Reyhani","year":"2012","venue":"Proceedings of the 20th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence, ECAI'12","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":39,"raw":"[Sen, 1999] Amartya Sen. The Possibility of Social Choice. American Economic Review, 89(3):349-378, 1999.","title":"Amartya Sen. The Possibility of Social Choice","authors":"Sen","year":"1999","venue":"American Economic Review","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":40,"raw":"[Tsetlin et al., 2003] Ilia Tsetlin, Michel Regenwetter, and Bernard Grofman. The impartial culture maximizes the probability of majority cycles. Social Choice and Welfare, 21(3):387-398, 2003.","title":"The impartial culture maximizes the probability of majority cycles","authors":"Ilia Tsetlin, Michel Regenwetter, Bernard Grofman","year":"2003","venue":"Social Choice and Welfare","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":41,"raw":"[Van Ditmarsch et al., 2013] Hans Van Ditmarsch, Jérôme Lang, and Abdallah Saffidine. Strategic voting and the logic of knowledge. arXiv preprint arXiv:1310.6436, 2013.","title":"Strategic voting and the logic of knowledge","authors":"Van Ditmarsch","year":"2013","venue":null,"doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":42,"raw":"[Xia and Conitzer, 2010] Lirong Xia and Vincent Conitzer. Stackelberg voting games: Computational aspects and paradoxes. In Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), pages 921-926, Atlanta, GA, USA, 2010.","title":"Stackelberg voting games: Computational aspects and paradoxes","authors":"Conitzer Xia, Lirong Xia, Vincent Conitzer","year":"2010","venue":"Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI)","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":43,"raw":"[Xia et al., 2011] Lirong Xia, Vincent Conitzer, and Jérôme Lang. Strategic sequential voting in multi-issue domains and multiple-election paradoxes. In Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC), pages 179-188, San Jose, CA, USA, 2011.","title":"Strategic sequential voting in multi-issue domains and multiple-election paradoxes","authors":"Lirong Xia, Vincent Conitzer, Jérôme Lang","year":"2011","venue":"Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC)","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":44,"raw":"[Xia, 2020] Lirong Xia. The smoothed possibility of social choice. Advances in Neural Information Processing Sys- tems, 33:11044-11055, 2020.","title":"The smoothed possibility of social choice","authors":"Lirong Xia","year":"2020","venue":"Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":45,"raw":"[Young, 1993] H Peyton Young. The Evolution of Conven- tions. Econometrica, 61(1):57-84, January 1993.","title":"The Evolution of Conventions","authors":"Young Peyton","year":"1993","venue":"Econometrica","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":46,"raw":"[Zou et al., 2015] James Zou, Reshef Meir, and David Parkes. Strategic voting behavior in doodle polls. In Proceedings of the 18th ACM Conference on Computer Supported Cooperative Work & Social Computing, CSCW '15, page 464-472, New York, NY, USA, 2015.","title":"Strategic voting behavior in doodle polls","authors":"James Zou, Reshef Meir, David Parkes","year":"2015","venue":"Proceedings of the 18th ACM Conference on Computer Supported Cooperative Work & Social Computing, CSCW '15","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null}],"license_note":"Copyright International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence."}