{"type":"ScholarlyArticle","title":"Fair Division with Two-Sided Preferences","authors":[{"name":"Ayumi Igarashi","slug":"ayumi-igarashi","given":"Ayumi","family":"Igarashi","affiliation":"University of Tokyo"},{"name":"Yasushi Kawase","slug":"yasushi-kawase","given":"Yasushi","family":"Kawase","affiliation":"University of Tokyo"},{"name":"Warut Suksompong","slug":"warut-suksompong","given":"Warut","family":"Suksompong","affiliation":"National University of Singapore"},{"name":"Hanna Sumita","slug":"hanna-sumita","given":"Hanna","family":"Sumita","affiliation":"Tokyo Institute of Technology"}],"abstract":"We study a fair division setting in which a number of players are to be fairly distributed among a set of teams. In our model, not only do the teams have preferences over the players as in the canonical fair division setting, but the players also have preferences over the teams. We focus on guaranteeing envy-freeness up to one player (EF1) for the teams together with a stability condition for both sides. We show that an allocation satisfying EF1, swap stability, and individual stability always exists and can be computed in polynomial time, even when teams may have positive or negative values for players. Similarly, a balanced and swap stable allocation that satisfies a relaxation of EF1 can be computed efficiently. When teams have nonnegative values for players, we prove that an EF1 and Pareto optimal allocation exists and, if the valuations are binary, can be found in polynomial time. We also examine the compatibility between EF1 and justified envy-freeness.","doi":"10.24963/ijcai.2023/307","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2023/307","pdf":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2023/0307.pdf","markdown":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2023/307.md","bibtex":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2023/bibtex/307","volume":{"slug":"2023","title":"Proceedings of the Thirty-Second International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence","short_title":"IJCAI 2023","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2023/","year":2023,"location":"Macao, SAR","dates":"19-25 August 2023","editors":"Edith Elkind","isbn":"978-1-956792-03-4","publisher":"International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization","doi_prefix":"10.24963/ijcai.2023"},"section":"Game Theory and Economic Paradigms","track":"Main Track","number":307,"pages":{"first":2756,"last":2764},"keywords":["Game Theory and Economic Paradigms: GTEP: Computational social choice","Game Theory and Economic Paradigms: GTEP: Fair division"],"videos":[],"references":[{"position":1,"raw":"[Aleksandrov and Walsh, 2020] Martin Aleksandrov and Toby Walsh. 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