{"type":"ScholarlyArticle","title":"First-Choice Maximality Meets Ex-ante and Ex-post Fairness","authors":[{"name":"Xiaoxi Guo","slug":"xiaoxi-guo","given":"Xiaoxi","family":"Guo","affiliation":"Key Laboratory of High Confidence Software Technologies (MOE) , School of Computer Science , Peking University"},{"name":"Sujoy Sikdar","slug":"sujoy-sikdar","given":"Sujoy","family":"Sikdar","affiliation":"Department of Computer Science , Binghamton University"},{"name":"Lirong Xia","slug":"lirong-xia","given":"Lirong","family":"Xia","affiliation":"Department of Computer Science , Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute"},{"name":"Yongzhi Cao","slug":"yongzhi-cao","given":"Yongzhi","family":"Cao","affiliation":"Key Laboratory of High Confidence Software Technologies (MOE) , School of Computer Science , Peking University"},{"name":"Hanpin Wang","slug":"hanpin-wang","given":"Hanpin","family":"Wang","affiliation":"School of Computer Science and Cyber Engineering , Guangzhou University; Key Laboratory of High Confidence Software Technologies (MOE) , School of Computer Science , Peking University"}],"abstract":"For the assignment problem where multiple indivisible items are allocated to a group of agents given their ordinal preferences, we design randomized mechanisms that satisfy first-choice maximality (FCM), i.e., maximizing the number of agents assigned their first choices, together with Pareto efficiency (PE). Our mechanisms also provide guarantees of ex-ante and ex-post fairness. The generalized eager Boston mechanism is ex-ante envy-free, and ex-post envy-free up to one item (EF1). The generalized probabilistic Boston mechanism is also ex-post EF1, and satisfies ex-ante efficiency instead of fairness. We also show that no strategyproof mechanism satisfies ex-post PE, EF1, and FCM simultaneously. In doing so, we expand the frontiers of simultaneously providing efficiency and both ex-ante and ex-post fairness guarantees for the assignment problem.","doi":"10.24963/ijcai.2023/303","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2023/303","pdf":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2023/0303.pdf","markdown":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2023/303.md","bibtex":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2023/bibtex/303","volume":{"slug":"2023","title":"Proceedings of the Thirty-Second International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence","short_title":"IJCAI 2023","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2023/","year":2023,"location":"Macao, SAR","dates":"19-25 August 2023","editors":"Edith Elkind","isbn":"978-1-956792-03-4","publisher":"International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization","doi_prefix":"10.24963/ijcai.2023"},"section":"Game Theory and Economic Paradigms","track":"Main Track","number":303,"pages":{"first":2719,"last":2727},"keywords":["Game Theory and Economic Paradigms: GTEP: Fair division","Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: MAS: Resource allocation","Game Theory and Economic Paradigms: GTEP: Computational social choice"],"videos":[],"references":[{"position":1,"raw":"[Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez, 2003] Atila Abdulkadiroglu and Tayfun Sönmez. School choice: A mechanism de- sign approach. American Economic Review, 93(3):729- 747, 2003.","title":"Atila Abdulkadiroglu and Tayfun Sönmez. School choice: A mechanism design approach","authors":"Sönmez Abdulkadiroglu","year":"2003","venue":"American Economic Review","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":2,"raw":"[Altuntas ¸and Phan, 2022] Ac ¸elya Altuntas ¸and William Phan. Trading probabilities along cycles. Journal of Math- ematical Economics, 100:102631, 2022.","title":"Ac ¸elya Altuntas ¸and William Phan. Trading probabilities along cycles","authors":"Altuntas ¸and Phan","year":"2022","venue":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":3,"raw":"[Athanassoglou and Sethuraman, 2011] Stergios Athanas- soglou and Jay Sethuraman. House allocation with fractional endowments. International Journal of Game Theory, 40(3):481-513, 2011.","title":"House allocation with fractional endowments","authors":"Sethuraman Athanassoglou","year":"2011","venue":"International Journal of Game Theory","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":4,"raw":"[Aziz and Brandl, 2021] Haris Aziz and Florian Brandl. Ef- ficient, fair, and incentive-compatible healthcare rationing. In Proceedings of the 22nd ACM Conference on Eco- nomics and Computation, pages 103-104, 2021.","title":"Efficient, fair, and incentive-compatible healthcare rationing","authors":"Haris Aziz, Florian Brandl","year":"2021","venue":"Proceedings of the 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":5,"raw":"[Aziz and Brandl, 2022] Haris Aziz and Florian Brandl. The vigilant eating rule: A general approach for probabilistic economic design with constraints. Games and Economic Behavior, 135:168-187, 2022.","title":"The vigilant eating rule: A general approach for probabilistic economic design with constraints","authors":"Haris Aziz, Florian Brandl","year":"2022","venue":"Games and Economic Behavior","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":6,"raw":"[Aziz, 2020] Haris Aziz. Simultaneously achieving ex-ante and ex-post fairness. In International Conference on Web and Internet Economics, pages 341-355. Springer, 2020.","title":"Simultaneously achieving ex-ante and ex-post fairness","authors":"Haris Aziz","year":"2020","venue":"International Conference on Web and Internet Economics","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":7,"raw":"[Babaioff et al., 2022] Moshe Babaioff, Tomer Ezra, and Uriel Feige. On best-of-both-worlds fair-share alloca- tions. In International Conference on Web and Internet Economics, pages 237-255. Springer, 2022.","title":"On best-of-both-worlds fair-share allocations","authors":"Babaioff","year":"2022","venue":"International Conference on Web and Internet Economics","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":8,"raw":"[Balbuzanov, 2022] Ivan Balbuzanov. Constrained random matching. Journal of Economic Theory, page 105472, 2022.","title":"Constrained random matching","authors":"Ivan Balbuzanov","year":"2022","venue":"Journal of Economic Theory","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":9,"raw":"[Biswas and Barman, 2018] Arpita Biswas and Siddharth Barman. Fair division under cardinality constraints. In Proceedings of the 27th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, page 91-97. AAAI Press, 2018.","title":"Fair division under cardinality constraints","authors":"Arpita Biswas, Siddharth Barman","year":"2018","venue":"Proceedings of the 27th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":"/proceedings/2018/13"},{"position":10,"raw":"[Biswas and Barman, 2019] Arpita Biswas and Siddharth Barman. Matroid constrained fair allocation problem. In Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelli- gence, pages 9921-9922, 2019.","title":"Matroid constrained fair allocation problem","authors":"Arpita Biswas, Siddharth Barman","year":"2019","venue":"Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":11,"raw":"[Bogomolnaia and Moulin, 2001] Anna Bogomolnaia and Hervé Moulin. A new solution to the random assignment problem. Journal of Economic Theory, 100(2):295-328, 2001.","title":"A new solution to the random assignment problem","authors":"Anna Bogomolnaia, Hervé Moulin","year":"2001","venue":"Journal of Economic Theory","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":12,"raw":"[Budish et al., 2013] Eric Budish, Yeon-Koo Che, Fuhito Kojima, and Paul Milgrom. Designing random allocation mechanisms: Theory and applications. American Eco- nomic Review, 103(2):585-623, 2013.","title":"Designing random allocation mechanisms: Theory and applications","authors":"Eric Budish, Yeon-Koo Che, Fuhito Kojima, Paul Milgrom","year":"2013","venue":"American Economic Review","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":13,"raw":"[Budish et al., 2017] Eric Budish, Gérard P Cachon, Judd B Kessler, and Abraham Othman. Course match: A large- scale implementation of approximate competitive equilib- rium from equal incomes for combinatorial allocation. Op- erations Research, 65(2):314-336, 2017.","title":"Course match: A largescale implementation of approximate competitive equilibrium from equal incomes for combinatorial allocation","authors":"Budish","year":"2017","venue":"Operations Research","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":14,"raw":"[Budish, 2011] Eric Budish. The combinatorial assign- ment problem: Approximate competitive equilibrium from equal incomes. Journal of Political Economy, 119(6):1061-1103, 2011.","title":"The combinatorial assignment problem: Approximate competitive equilibrium from equal incomes","authors":"Eric Budish","year":"2011","venue":"Journal of Political Economy","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":15,"raw":"[Caragiannis et al., 2019] Ioannis Caragiannis, David Kurokawa, Hervé Moulin, Ariel D Procaccia, Nisarg Shah, and Junxing Wang. The unreasonable fairness of maximum nash welfare. ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, 7(3):1-32, 2019.","title":"The unreasonable fairness of maximum nash welfare","authors":"Ioannis Caragiannis, David Kurokawa, Hervé Moulin, Ariel D Procaccia, Nisarg Shah, Junxing Wang","year":"2019","venue":"ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":16,"raw":"[Chen and Sönmez, 2006] Yan Chen and Tayfun Sönmez. School choice: An experimental study. Journal of Eco- nomic Theory, 127(1):202-231, 2006.","title":"School choice: An experimental study","authors":"Chen, Sönmez ; ] Yan, Chen, Tayfun Sönmez","year":"2006","venue":"Journal of Economic Theory","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":17,"raw":"[Dror et al., 2021] Amitay Dror, Michal Feldman, and Erel Segal-Halevi. On fair division under heterogeneous ma- troid constraints. In Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, pages 5312-5320, 2021.","title":"On fair division under heterogeneous matroid constraints","authors":"Amitay Dror, Michal Feldman, Erel Segal-Halevi","year":"2021","venue":"Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":18,"raw":"[Dur et al., 2018] Umut Dur, Timo Mennle, and Sven Seuken. First-choice maximal and first-choice stable school choice mechanisms. In Proceedings of the 2018 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, pages 251-268, 2018.","title":"First-choice maximal and first-choice stable school choice mechanisms","authors":"Umut Dur, Timo Mennle, Sven Seuken","year":"2018","venue":"Proceedings of the 2018 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":19,"raw":"[Foley, 1966] Duncan Karl Foley. Resource Allocation and the Public Sector. PhD thesis, Yale University, 1966.","title":"Resource Allocation and the Public Sector","authors":"Karl Duncan, Foley","year":"1966","venue":null,"doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":20,"raw":"[Freeman et al., 2020] Rupert Freeman, Nisarg Shah, and Rohit Vaish. Best of both worlds: Ex-ante and ex-post fairness in resource allocation. In Proceedings of the 21st ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, pages 21-22, 2020.","title":"Best of both worlds: Ex-ante and ex-post fairness in resource allocation","authors":"Rupert Freeman, Nisarg Shah, Rohit Vaish","year":"2020","venue":"Proceedings of the 21st ACM Conference on Economics and Computation","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":21,"raw":"[Friedman, 1955] Milton Friedman. The role of government in education. In Economics and the Public Interest. Rut- gers University Press, 1955.","title":"The role of government in education","authors":"Milton Friedman","year":"1955","venue":"Economics and the Public Interest","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":22,"raw":"[Friedman, 1962] Milton Friedman. Capitalism and free- dom. Ethics, 74(1), 1962.","title":"Capitalism and freedom","authors":"Milton Friedman","year":"1962","venue":"Ethics","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":23,"raw":"[Gamow and Stern, 1958] George Gamow and Marvin Stern. Puzzle-Math. Viking Press, 1958.","title":"George Gamow and Marvin Stern","authors":"Stern Gamow","year":"1958","venue":null,"doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":24,"raw":"[Garg et al., 2010] Naveen Garg, Telikepalli Kavitha, Amit Kumar, Kurt Mehlhorn, and Julián Mestre. Assigning pa- pers to referees. Algorithmica, 58(1):119-136, 2010.","title":"Assigning papers to referees","authors":"Naveen Garg, Telikepalli Kavitha, Amit Kumar, Kurt Mehlhorn, Julián Mestre","year":"2010","venue":"Algorithmica","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":25,"raw":"[Ghodsi et al., 2011] Ali Ghodsi, Matei Zaharia, Benjamin Hindman, Andy Konwinski, Scott Shenker, and Ion Sto- ica. Dominant resource fairness: Fair allocation of mul- tiple resource types. In Proceedings of the 8th USENIX Conference on Networked Systems Design and Implemen- tation, pages 323-336, 2011.","title":"Dominant resource fairness: Fair allocation of multiple resource types","authors":"Ali Ghodsi, Matei Zaharia, Benjamin Hindman, Andy Konwinski, Scott Shenker, Ion Stoica","year":"2011","venue":"Proceedings of the 8th USENIX Conference on Networked Systems Design and Implementation","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":26,"raw":"[Grandl et al., 2014] Robert Grandl, Ganesh Anantha- narayanan, Srikanth Kandula, Sriram Rao, and Aditya Akella. Multi-resource packing for cluster schedulers. In Proceedings of the 2014 ACM Conference on SIGCOMM, pages 455-466, 2014.","title":"Multi-resource packing for cluster schedulers","authors":"Robert Grandl, Ganesh Ananthanarayanan, Srikanth Kandula, Sriram Rao, Aditya Akella","year":"2014","venue":"Proceedings of the 2014 ACM Conference on SIGCOMM","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":27,"raw":"[Guo et al., 2023] Xiaoxi Guo, Sujoy Sikdar, Lirong Xia, Yongzhi Cao, and Hanpin Wang. Favoring eagerness for remaining items: Designing efficient, fair, and strat- egyproof mechanisms. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 76:287-339, 2023.","title":"Favoring eagerness for remaining items: Designing efficient, fair, and strategyproof mechanisms","authors":"Xiaoxi Guo, Sujoy Sikdar, Lirong Xia, Yongzhi Cao, Hanpin Wang","year":"2023","venue":"Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":28,"raw":"[Hoefer et al., 2022] Martin Hoefer, Marco Schmalhofer, and Giovanna Varricchio. Best of both worlds: Agents with entitlements. arXiv preprint arXiv:2209.03908, 2022.","title":"Best of both worlds: Agents with entitlements","authors":"Martin Hoefer, Marco Schmalhofer, Giovanna Varricchio","year":"2022","venue":null,"doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":29,"raw":"[Hosseini and Larson, 2019] Hadi Hosseini and Kate Lar- son. Multiple assignment problems under lexicographic preferences. In Proceedings of the 18th International Con- ference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems, pages 837-845, 2019.","title":"Multiple assignment problems under lexicographic preferences","authors":"Hadi Hosseini, Kate Larson","year":"2019","venue":"Proceedings of the 18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":30,"raw":"[Hosseini et al., 2021] Hadi Hosseini, Sujoy Sikdar, Rohit Vaish, and Lirong Xia. Fair and efficient allocations un- der lexicographic preferences. In Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, pages 5472-5480, 2021.","title":"Fair and efficient allocations under lexicographic preferences","authors":"Hadi Hosseini, Sujoy Sikdar, Rohit Vaish, Lirong Xia","year":"2021","venue":"Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":31,"raw":"[Irving et al., 2006] Robert W. Irving, Telikepalli Kavitha, Kurt Mehlhorn, Dimitrios Michail, and Katarzyna E. Paluch. Rank-maximal matchings. ACM Transactions on Algorithms, 2(4):602-610, 2006.","title":"Rank-maximal matchings","authors":"Robert W Irving, Telikepalli Kavitha, Kurt Mehlhorn, Dimitrios Michail, Katarzyna E Paluch","year":"2006","venue":"ACM Transactions on Algorithms","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":32,"raw":"[Kawase et al., 2020] Yasushi Kawase, Yutaro Yamaguchi, and Yu Yokoi. Subgame perfect equilibria of sequential matching games. ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, 7(4):1-30, 2020.","title":"Subgame perfect equilibria of sequential matching games","authors":"Yasushi Kawase, Yutaro Yamaguchi, Yu Yokoi","year":"2020","venue":"ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":33,"raw":"[Kirkpatrick et al., 2020] James N Kirkpatrick, Sarah C Hull, Savitri Fedson, Brendan Mullen, and Sarah J Goodlin. Scarce-resource allocation and patient triage dur- ing the COVID-19 pandemic. Journal of the American College of Cardiology, 76(1):85-92, 2020.","title":"Scarce-resource allocation and patient triage during the COVID-19 pandemic","authors":"Sarah C James N Kirkpatrick, Savitri Hull, Brendan Fedson, Sarah J Mullen, Goodlin","year":"2020","venue":"Journal of the American College of Cardiology","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":34,"raw":"[Kojima and Ünver, 2014] Fuhito Kojima and M. Utku Ünver. The \"Boston\" school-choice mechanism: an ax- iomatic approach. Economic Theory, 55(3):515-544, 2014.","title":"The \"Boston\" school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach","authors":"Ünver ; Fuhito Kojima, M Utku Kojima, Ünver","year":"2014","venue":"Economic Theory","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":35,"raw":"[Kojima, 2009] Fuhito Kojima. Random assignment of mul- tiple indivisible objects. Mathematical Social Sciences, 57(1):134-142, 2009.","title":"Fuhito Kojima. Random assignment of multiple indivisible objects","authors":"Kojima","year":"2009","venue":"Mathematical Social Sciences","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":36,"raw":"[Li, 2020] Mengling Li. Ties matter: Improving efficiency in course allocation by allowing ties. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 178:354-384, 2020.","title":"Ties matter: Improving efficiency in course allocation by allowing ties","authors":"Li ;, Mengling Li","year":"2020","venue":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":37,"raw":"[Manlove, 2013] David Manlove. Algorithmics of Matching under Preferences. World Scientific, 2013.","title":"Algorithmics of Matching under Preferences","authors":"David Manlove","year":"2013","venue":null,"doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":38,"raw":"[Moulin, 2004] H. Moulin. Fair Division and Collective Welfare. MIT Press, 2004.","title":"Fair Division and Collective Welfare","authors":"H Moulin","year":"2004","venue":null,"doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":39,"raw":"[Pathak et al., 2021] Parag A Pathak, Tayfun Sönmez, M Utku Ünver, and M Bumin Yenmez. Fair allocation of vaccines, ventilators and antiviral treatments: Leaving no ethical value behind in health care rationing. In Pro- ceedings of the 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, pages 785-786, 2021.","title":"Fair allocation of vaccines, ventilators and antiviral treatments: Leaving no ethical value behind in health care rationing","authors":"A Parag, Tayfun Pathak, M Sönmez, M Utku Ünver, Yenmez Bumin","year":"2021","venue":"Proceedings of the 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":40,"raw":"[Ramezanian and Feizi, 2021] Rasoul Ramezanian and Mehdi Feizi. Ex-post favoring ranks: A fairness notion for the random assignment problem. Review of Economic Design, 25:157-176, 2021. [Sayedahmed and others, 2022] Dilek Sayedahmed et al. Centralized refugee matching mechanisms with hierarchi- cal priority classes. The Journal of Mechanism and Insti- tution Design, 7(1):71-111, 2022.","title":"Ex-post favoring ranks: A fairness notion for the random assignment problem","authors":"Feizi Ramezanian, Rasoul Ramezanian, Mehdi Feizi","year":"2021","venue":"The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":41,"raw":"[Wang et al., 2023] Haibin Wang, Sujoy Sikdar, Xiaoxi Guo, Lirong Xia, Yongzhi Cao, and Hanpin Wang. Multi re- source allocation with partial preferences. Artificial Intel- ligence, 314:103824, 2023.","title":"Multi resource allocation with partial preferences","authors":"Haibin Wang, Sujoy Sikdar, Xiaoxi Guo, Lirong Xia, Yongzhi Cao, Hanpin Wang","year":"2023","venue":"Artificial Intelligence","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":42,"raw":"[Yılmaz, 2010] Özgür Yılmaz. The probabilistic serial mechanism with private endowments. Games and Eco- nomic Behavior, 69(2):475-491, 2010.","title":"The probabilistic serial mechanism with private endowments","authors":"Özgür Yılmaz, Yılmaz","year":"2010","venue":"Games and Economic Behavior","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null}],"license_note":"Copyright International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence."}