{"type":"ScholarlyArticle","title":"New Algorithms for the Fair and Efficient Allocation of Indivisible Chores","authors":[{"name":"Jugal Garg","slug":"jugal-garg","given":"Jugal","family":"Garg","affiliation":"University of Illinois , Urbana-Champaign"},{"name":"Aniket Murhekar","slug":"aniket-murhekar","given":"Aniket","family":"Murhekar","affiliation":"University of Illinois , Urbana-Champaign"},{"name":"John Qin","slug":"john-qin","given":"John","family":"Qin","affiliation":"University of Illinois , Urbana-Champaign"}],"abstract":"We study the problem of fairly and efficiently allocating indivisible chores among agents with additive disutility functions. We consider the widely used envy-based fairness properties of EF1 and EFX in conjunction with the efficiency property of fractional Pareto-optimality (fPO). Existence (and computation) of an allocation that is simultaneously EF1/EFX and fPO are challenging open problems, and we make progress on both of them. We show the existence of an allocation that is\r\n- EF1 + fPO, when there are three agents,\r\n- EF1 + fPO, when there are at most two disutility functions,\r\n- EFX + fPO, for three agents with bivalued disutility functions.\r\nThese results are constructive, based on strongly polynomial-time algorithms. We also investigate non-existence and show that an allocation that is EFX+fPO need not exist, even for two agents.","doi":"10.24963/ijcai.2023/302","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2023/302","pdf":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2023/0302.pdf","markdown":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2023/302.md","bibtex":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2023/bibtex/302","volume":{"slug":"2023","title":"Proceedings of the Thirty-Second International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence","short_title":"IJCAI 2023","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2023/","year":2023,"location":"Macao, SAR","dates":"19-25 August 2023","editors":"Edith Elkind","isbn":"978-1-956792-03-4","publisher":"International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization","doi_prefix":"10.24963/ijcai.2023"},"section":"Game Theory and Economic Paradigms","track":"Main Track","number":302,"pages":{"first":2710,"last":2718},"keywords":["Game Theory and Economic Paradigms: GTEP: Computational social choice","Game Theory and Economic Paradigms: GTEP: Fair division","Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: MAS: Resource allocation"],"videos":[],"references":[{"position":1,"raw":"[Akrami et al., 2022] Hannaneh Akrami, Bhaskar Ray Chaudhury, Jugal Garg, Kurt Mehlhorn, and Ruta Mehta. 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