{"type":"ScholarlyArticle","title":"Strategic Resource Selection with Homophilic Agents","authors":[{"name":"Jonathan Gadea Harder","slug":"jonathan-gadea-harder","given":"Jonathan","family":"Gadea Harder","affiliation":"Hasso Plattner Institute , University of Potsdam"},{"name":"Simon Krogmann","slug":"simon-krogmann","given":"Simon","family":"Krogmann","affiliation":"Hasso Plattner Institute , University of Potsdam"},{"name":"Pascal Lenzner","slug":"pascal-lenzner","given":"Pascal","family":"Lenzner","affiliation":"Hasso Plattner Institute , University of Potsdam"},{"name":"Alexander Skopalik","slug":"alexander-skopalik","given":"Alexander","family":"Skopalik","affiliation":"Mathematics of Operations Research , University of Twente"}],"abstract":"The strategic selection of resources  by selfish agents is a classical research direction, with Resource Selection Games and Congestion Games as prominent examples. In these games, agents select available resources and their utility then depends on the number of agents using the same resources. This implies that there is no distinction between the agents, i.e., they are anonymous.\r\n\r\nWe depart from this very general setting by proposing Resource Selection Games with heterogeneous agents that strive for a joint resource usage with similar agents. So, instead of the number of other users of a given resource, our model considers agents with different types and the decisive feature is the fraction of same-type agents among the users. More precisely, similarly to Schelling Games, there is a tolerance threshold tau in [0,1] which specifies the agents' desired minimum fraction of same-type agents on a resource. Agents strive to select resources where at least a tau-fraction of those resources' users have the same type as themselves. For tau=1, our model generalizes hedonic diversity games with single-peaked utilities with a peak at 1. \r\n\r\nFor our general model, we consider the existence and quality of equilibria and the complexity of maximizing the social welfare. Additionally, we consider a bounded rationality model, where agents can only estimate the utility of a resource, since they only know the fraction of same-type agents on a given resource, but not the exact numbers. Thus, they cannot know the impact a strategy change would have on a target resource. Interestingly, we show that this type of bounded rationality yields favorable game-theoretic properties and specific equilibria closely approximate equilibria of the full knowledge setting.","doi":"10.24963/ijcai.2023/301","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2023/301","pdf":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2023/0301.pdf","markdown":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2023/301.md","bibtex":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2023/bibtex/301","volume":{"slug":"2023","title":"Proceedings of the Thirty-Second International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence","short_title":"IJCAI 2023","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2023/","year":2023,"location":"Macao, SAR","dates":"19-25 August 2023","editors":"Edith Elkind","isbn":"978-1-956792-03-4","publisher":"International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization","doi_prefix":"10.24963/ijcai.2023"},"section":"Game Theory and Economic Paradigms","track":"Main Track","number":301,"pages":{"first":2701,"last":2709},"keywords":["Game Theory and Economic Paradigms: GTEP: Noncooperative games","Game Theory and Economic Paradigms: GTEP: Computational social choice"],"videos":[],"references":[{"position":1,"raw":"[Agarwal et al., 2021] Aishwarya Agarwal, Edith Elkind, Jiarui Gan, Ayumi Igarashi, Warut Suksompong, and Alexandros A. 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