{"type":"ScholarlyArticle","title":"New Fairness Concepts for Allocating Indivisible Items","authors":[{"name":"Ioannis Caragiannis","slug":"ioannis-caragiannis","given":"Ioannis","family":"Caragiannis","affiliation":"Aarhus University , Aarhus , Denmark"},{"name":"Jugal Garg","slug":"jugal-garg","given":"Jugal","family":"Garg","affiliation":"University of Illinois , Urbana-Champaign , USA"},{"name":"Nidhi Rathi","slug":"nidhi-rathi","given":"Nidhi","family":"Rathi","affiliation":"Aarhus University , Aarhus , Denmark"},{"name":"Eklavya Sharma","slug":"eklavya-sharma","given":"Eklavya","family":"Sharma","affiliation":"University of Illinois , Urbana-Champaign , USA"},{"name":"Giovanna Varricchio","slug":"giovanna-varricchio","given":"Giovanna","family":"Varricchio","affiliation":"Goethe University Frankfurt , Frankfurt am Main , Germany"}],"abstract":"For the fundamental problem of fairly dividing a set of indivisible items among agents, envy-freeness up to any item (EFX) and maximin fairness (MMS) are arguably the most compelling fairness concepts proposed till now.  Unfortunately, despite significant efforts over the past few years, whether EFX allocations always exist is still an enigmatic open problem, let alone their efficient computation. Furthermore, today we know that MMS allocations are not always guaranteed to exist. These facts weaken the usefulness of both EFX and MMS, albeit their appealing conceptual characteristics. \r\n\r\nWe propose two alternative fairness concepts—called epistemic EFX (EEFX) and minimum EFX value fairness (MXS)---inspired by EFX and MMS. For both, we explore their relationships to well-studied fairness notions and, more importantly, prove that EEFX and MXS allocations always exist and can be computed efficiently for additive valuations. Our results justify that the new fairness concepts are excellent alternatives to EFX and MMS.","doi":"10.24963/ijcai.2023/284","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2023/284","pdf":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2023/0284.pdf","markdown":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2023/284.md","bibtex":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2023/bibtex/284","volume":{"slug":"2023","title":"Proceedings of the Thirty-Second International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence","short_title":"IJCAI 2023","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2023/","year":2023,"location":"Macao, SAR","dates":"19-25 August 2023","editors":"Edith Elkind","isbn":"978-1-956792-03-4","publisher":"International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization","doi_prefix":"10.24963/ijcai.2023"},"section":"Game Theory and Economic Paradigms","track":"Main Track","number":284,"pages":{"first":2554,"last":2562},"keywords":["Game Theory and Economic Paradigms: GTEP: Fair division","Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: MAS: Resource allocation","Game Theory and Economic Paradigms: GTEP: Computational social choice"],"videos":[],"references":[{"position":1,"raw":"[Amanatidis et al., 2017] Georgios Amanatidis, Evangelos Markakis, Afshin Nikzad, and Amin Saberi. 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