{"type":"ScholarlyArticle","title":"Outsourcing Adjudication to Strategic Jurors","authors":[{"name":"Ioannis Caragiannis","slug":"ioannis-caragiannis","given":"Ioannis","family":"Caragiannis","affiliation":"Department of Computer Science , Aarhus University"},{"name":"Nikolaj Schwartzbach","slug":"nikolaj-schwartzbach","given":"Nikolaj","family":"Schwartzbach","affiliation":"Department of Computer Science , Aarhus University"}],"abstract":"We study a scenario where an adjudication task (e.g., the resolution of a binary dispute) is outsourced to a set of agents who are appointed as jurors. This scenario is particularly relevant in a Web3 environment, where no verification of the adjudication outcome is possible, and the appointed agents are, in principle, indifferent to the final verdict. We consider simple adjudication mechanisms that use (1) majority voting to decide the final verdict and (2) a payment function to reward the agents with the majority vote and possibly punish the ones in the minority. Agents interact with such a mechanism strategically: they exert some effort to understand how to properly judge the dispute and cast a yes/no vote that depends on this understanding and on information they have about the rest of the votes. Eventually, they vote so that their utility (i.e., their payment from the mechanism minus the cost due to their effort) is maximized. Under reasonable assumptions about how an agent's effort is related to her understanding of the dispute, we show that appropriate payment functions can be used to recover the correct adjudication outcome with high probability. Our findings follow from a detailed analysis of the induced strategic game and make use of both theoretical arguments and simulation experiments.","doi":"10.24963/ijcai.2023/283","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2023/283","pdf":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2023/0283.pdf","markdown":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2023/283.md","bibtex":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2023/bibtex/283","volume":{"slug":"2023","title":"Proceedings of the Thirty-Second International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence","short_title":"IJCAI 2023","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2023/","year":2023,"location":"Macao, SAR","dates":"19-25 August 2023","editors":"Edith Elkind","isbn":"978-1-956792-03-4","publisher":"International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization","doi_prefix":"10.24963/ijcai.2023"},"section":"Game Theory and Economic Paradigms","track":"Main Track","number":283,"pages":{"first":2546,"last":2553},"keywords":["Game Theory and Economic Paradigms: GTEP: Auctions and market-based systems","Game Theory and Economic Paradigms: GTEP: Noncooperative games","Game Theory and Economic Paradigms: GTEP: Computational social choice"],"videos":[],"references":[{"position":1,"raw":"Arrow, 1951","title":null,"authors":"Arrow","year":"1951","venue":null,"doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":2,"raw":"Kenneth J. Arrow. Social Choice and Individ- ual Values. John Wiley & Sons, 1951.","title":"Social Choice and Individual Values","authors":"J Kenneth, Arrow","year":"1951","venue":null,"doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":3,"raw":"[Brandt et al., 2016] Felix Brandt, Vincent Conitzer, Ulle Endriss, Jérôme Lang, and Ariel D. Procaccia, editors. Handbook of Computational Social Choice. Cambridge University Press, 2016.","title":"Handbook of Computational Social Choice","authors":null,"year":"2016","venue":null,"doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":4,"raw":"[Caragiannis et al., 2016] Ioannis Caragiannis, Ariel D. Pro- caccia, and Nisarg Shah. When do noisy votes reveal the truth? ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, 4(3):15:1-15:30, 2016.","title":"When do noisy votes reveal the truth?","authors":"Ioannis Caragiannis, D Ariel","year":"2016","venue":"ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":5,"raw":"[Conitzer and Sandholm, 2005] Vincent Conitzer and Tuo- mas Sandholm. Common voting rules as maximum like- lihood estimators. In Proceedings of the 21st Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence (UAI), pages 145- 152, 2005.","title":"Common voting rules as maximum likelihood estimators","authors":"Sandholm ; Conitzer, Tuomas Conitzer, Sandholm","year":"2005","venue":"Proceedings of the 21st Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence (UAI)","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":6,"raw":"[Faltings and Radanovic, 2017] Boi Faltings and Goran Radanovic. Game Theory for Data Science: Eliciting Truthful Information. Morgan & Claypool Publishers, 2017.","title":"Game Theory for Data Science: Eliciting Truthful Information","authors":"Radanovic Faltings","year":"2017","venue":null,"doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":7,"raw":"[Gerardi and Yariv, 2008] Dino Gerardi and Leeat Yariv. In- formation acquisition in committees. Games and Eco- nomic Behavior, 62(2):436-459, 2008.","title":"Information acquisition in committees","authors":"Yariv Gerardi, Dino Gerardi, Leeat Yariv","year":"2008","venue":"Games and Economic Behavior","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":8,"raw":"[Gersbach, 1995] Hans Gersbach. Information efficiency and majority decisions. Social Choice and Welfare, 12(4):363-370, 1995.","title":"Information efficiency and majority decisions","authors":"Hans Gersbach, Gersbach","year":"1995","venue":"Social Choice and Welfare","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":9,"raw":"[Gibbard, 1973] Allan Gibbard. Manipulation of voting schemes: A general result. Econometrica, 41(4):587-601, 1973.","title":"Manipulation of voting schemes: A general result","authors":"Allan Gibbard","year":"1973","venue":"Econometrica","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":10,"raw":"[Hoeffding, 1963] Wassily Hoeffding. Probability inequali- ties for sums of bounded random variables. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 58(301):13-30, 1963.","title":"Wassily Hoeffding. Probability inequalities for sums of bounded random variables","authors":"Hoeffding","year":"1963","venue":"Journal of the American Statistical Association","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":11,"raw":"[Lesaege et al., 2019] Clément Lesaege, Federico Ast, and William George. Kleros Short Paper v1.0.7. Technical report, Kleros, 09 2019.","title":"Kleros Short Paper v1.0.7","authors":"Clément Lesaege, Federico Ast, William George","year":"2019","venue":"Kleros","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":12,"raw":"[Lesaege et al., 2021] Clément Lesaege, William George, and Federico Ast. Kleros Long Paper v2.0.2. Technical report, Kleros, 07 2021.","title":"Kleros Long Paper v2.0.2","authors":"Clément Lesaege, William George, Federico Ast","year":"2021","venue":"Kleros","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":13,"raw":"[Michelini et al., 2022] Matteo Michelini, Adrian Haret, and Davide Grossi. Group wisdom at a price: Jury theorems with costly information. In Proceedings of the 31st In- ternational Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJ- CAI), pages 419-425, 2022.","title":"Group wisdom at a price: Jury theorems with costly information","authors":"Matteo Michelini, Adrian Haret, Davide Grossi","year":"2022","venue":"Proceedings of the 31st International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJ-CAI)","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":"/proceedings/2022/60"},{"position":14,"raw":"[Persico, 2004] Nicola Persico. Committee Design with En- dogenous Information. The Review of Economic Studies, 71(1):165-191, 01 2004.","title":"Committee Design with Endogenous Information","authors":"Nicola Persico","year":"2004","venue":"The Review of Economic Studies","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":15,"raw":"[Posner and Weyl, 2018] Eric A. Posner and E. Glen Weyl. Radical Markets: Uprooting Capitalism and Democracy for a Just Society. Princeton University Press, 2018.","title":"Radical Markets: Uprooting Capitalism and Democracy for a Just Society","authors":"Weyl Posner, Eric A Posner, E, Glen Weyl","year":"2018","venue":null,"doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":16,"raw":"[Sandholm, 2003] Tuomas Sandholm. Automated mecha- nism design: A new application area for search algorithms. In Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Principles and Practice of Constraint Programming (CP), pages 19-36, 2003.","title":"Automated mechanism design: A new application area for search algorithms","authors":"Tuomas Sandholm, Sandholm","year":"2003","venue":"Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Principles and Practice of Constraint Programming (CP)","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":17,"raw":"[Satterthwaite, 1975] Mark. A. Satterthwaite. Strategy- proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and corre- spondence theorems for voting procedures and social wel- fare functions. Journal of Economic Theory, 10:187-217, 1975.","title":"Strategyproofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions","authors":"A Mark, Satterthwaite","year":"1975","venue":"Journal of Economic Theory","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":18,"raw":"[Schwartzbach, 2021] Nikolaj I. Schwartzbach. An incentive-compatible smart contract for decentralized commerce. In Proceedings of the 2021 IEEE Interna- tional Conference on Blockchain and Cryptocurrency (ICBC), pages 1-3, 2021.","title":"An incentive-compatible smart contract for decentralized commerce","authors":"I Nikolaj, Schwartzbach","year":"2021","venue":"Proceedings of the 2021 IEEE International Conference on Blockchain and Cryptocurrency (ICBC)","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":19,"raw":"[Shah et al., 2015] Nihar B. Shah, Dengyong Zhou, and Yu- val Peres. Approval voting and incentives in crowdsourc- ing. In Proceedings of the 32nd International Confer- ence on International Conference on Machine Learning (ICML), page 10-19, 2015.","title":"Approval voting and incentives in crowdsourcing","authors":"B Nihar, Dengyong Shah, Yuval Zhou, Peres","year":"2015","venue":"Proceedings of the 32nd International Conference on International Conference on Machine Learning (ICML)","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":20,"raw":"[Witkowski et al., 2018] Jens Witkowski, Rupert Freeman, Jennifer Vaughan, David Pennock, and Andreas Krause. Incentive-compatible forecasting competitions. In Pro- ceedings of 32nd AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelli- gence (AAAI), 2018.","title":"Incentive-compatible forecasting competitions","authors":"Witkowski","year":"2018","venue":"Proceedings of 32nd AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI)","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":21,"raw":"[Young, 1988] H. Peyton Young. Condorcet's theory of vot- ing. American Political Science Review, 82(4):1231-1244, 1988.","title":"Condorcet's theory of voting","authors":"H, Peyton Young","year":"1988","venue":"American Political Science Review","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null}],"license_note":"Copyright International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence."}