{"type":"ScholarlyArticle","title":"Temporal Network Creation Games","authors":[{"name":"Davide Bilò","slug":"davide-bilo","given":"Davide","family":"Bilò","affiliation":"University of L'Aquila , Italy"},{"name":"Sarel Cohen","slug":"sarel-cohen","given":"Sarel","family":"Cohen","affiliation":"Hasso Plattner Institute Potsdam , Germany"},{"name":"Tobias Friedrich","slug":"tobias-friedrich","given":"Tobias","family":"Friedrich","affiliation":"Hasso Plattner Institute Potsdam , Germany"},{"name":"Hans Gawendowicz","slug":"hans-gawendowicz","given":"Hans","family":"Gawendowicz","affiliation":"Hasso Plattner Institute Potsdam , Germany"},{"name":"Nicolas Klodt","slug":"nicolas-klodt","given":"Nicolas","family":"Klodt","affiliation":"Hasso Plattner Institute Potsdam , Germany"},{"name":"Pascal Lenzner","slug":"pascal-lenzner","given":"Pascal","family":"Lenzner","affiliation":"Hasso Plattner Institute Potsdam , Germany"},{"name":"George Skretas","slug":"george-skretas","given":"George","family":"Skretas","affiliation":"Hasso Plattner Institute Potsdam , Germany"}],"abstract":"Most networks are not static objects, but instead they change over time. This observation has sparked rigorous research on temporal graphs within the last years. In temporal graphs, we have a fixed set of nodes and the connections between them are only available at certain time steps. This gives rise to a plethora of algorithmic problems on such graphs, most prominently the problem of finding temporal spanners, i.e., the computation of subgraphs that guarantee all pairs reachability via temporal paths. To the best of our knowledge, only centralized approaches for the solution of this problem are known. However, many real-world networks are not shaped by a central designer but instead they emerge and evolve by the interaction of many strategic agents. This observation is the driving force of the recent intensive research on game-theoretic network formation models.      \r\n\r\nIn this work we bring together these two recent research directions: temporal graphs and game-theoretic network formation. As a first step into this new realm, we focus on a simplified setting where a complete temporal host graph is given and the agents, corresponding to its nodes, selfishly create incident edges to ensure that they can reach all other nodes via temporal paths in the created network. This yields temporal spanners as equilibria of our game. We prove results on the convergence to and the existence of equilibrium networks, on the complexity of finding best agent strategies, and on the quality of the equilibria. By taking these first important steps, we uncover challenging open problems that call for an in-depth exploration of the creation of temporal graphs by strategic agents.","doi":"10.24963/ijcai.2023/279","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2023/279","pdf":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2023/0279.pdf","markdown":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2023/279.md","bibtex":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2023/bibtex/279","volume":{"slug":"2023","title":"Proceedings of the Thirty-Second International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence","short_title":"IJCAI 2023","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2023/","year":2023,"location":"Macao, SAR","dates":"19-25 August 2023","editors":"Edith Elkind","isbn":"978-1-956792-03-4","publisher":"International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization","doi_prefix":"10.24963/ijcai.2023"},"section":"Game Theory and Economic Paradigms","track":"Main Track","number":279,"pages":{"first":2511,"last":2519},"keywords":["Game Theory and Economic Paradigms: GTEP: Noncooperative games"],"videos":[],"references":[{"position":1,"raw":"[Ahmed et al., 2020] Abu Reyan Ahmed, Greg Bodwin, Faryad Darabi Sahneh, Keaton Hamm, Mohammad Javad Latifi Jebelli, Stephen G. 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