{"type":"ScholarlyArticle","title":"Non-Obvious Manipulability in Extensive-Form Mechanisms: The Revelation Principle for Single-Parameter Agents","authors":[{"name":"Thomas Archbold","slug":"thomas-archbold","given":"Thomas","family":"Archbold","affiliation":"King's College London"},{"name":"Bart de Keijzer","slug":"bart-de-keijzer","given":"Bart","family":"de Keijzer","affiliation":"King's College London"},{"name":"Carmine Ventre","slug":"carmine-ventre","given":"Carmine","family":"Ventre","affiliation":"King's College London"}],"abstract":"Recent work in algorithmic mechanism design focuses on designing mechanisms for agents with bounded rationality, modifying the constraints that must be satisfied in order to achieve incentive compatibility.  Starting with Li's strengthening of strategyproofness, obvious strategyproofness (OSP) requires truthtelling to be \"obvious\" over dishonesty, roughly meaning that the worst outcome from truthful actions must be no worse than the best outcome for dishonest ones. A celebrated result for dominant-strategy incentive-compatible mechanisms that allows us to restrict attention to direct mechanisms, known as the revelation principle, does not hold for OSP: the implementation details matter for the obvious incentive properties of the mechanism. Studying agent strategies in real-life mechanisms, Troyan and Morrill introduce a relaxation of strategyproofness known as non-obvious manipulability, which only requires comparing certain extrema of the agents' utility functions in order for a mechanism to be incentive-compatible. Specifically a mechanism is not obviously manipulable (NOM) if the best and worst outcomes when acting truthfully are no worse than the best and worst outcomes when acting dishonestly. In this work we first extend the cycle monotonicity framework for direct-revelation NOM mechanism design to indirect mechanisms. We then apply this to two settings, single-parameter agents and mechanisms for two agents in which one has a two-value domain, and show that under these models the revelation principle holds: direct mechanisms are just as powerful as indirect ones.","doi":"10.24963/ijcai.2023/278","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2023/278","pdf":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2023/0278.pdf","markdown":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2023/278.md","bibtex":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2023/bibtex/278","volume":{"slug":"2023","title":"Proceedings of the Thirty-Second International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence","short_title":"IJCAI 2023","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2023/","year":2023,"location":"Macao, SAR","dates":"19-25 August 2023","editors":"Edith Elkind","isbn":"978-1-956792-03-4","publisher":"International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization","doi_prefix":"10.24963/ijcai.2023"},"section":"Game Theory and Economic Paradigms","track":"Main Track","number":278,"pages":{"first":2503,"last":2510},"keywords":["Multidisciplinary Topics and Applications: MDA: Economics","Game Theory and Economic Paradigms: GTEP: Auctions and market-based systems","Game Theory and Economic Paradigms: GTEP: Mechanism design"],"videos":[],"references":[{"position":1,"raw":"[Archbold et al., 2023] Thomas Archbold, Bart De Keijzer, and Carmine Ventre. 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