{"type":"ScholarlyArticle","title":"Achieving Envy-Freeness with Limited Subsidies under Dichotomous Valuations","authors":[{"name":"Siddharth Barman","slug":"siddharth-barman","given":"Siddharth","family":"Barman","affiliation":"Indian Institute of Science , Bengaluru"},{"name":"Anand Krishna","slug":"anand-krishna","given":"Anand","family":"Krishna","affiliation":"Indian Institute of Science , Bengaluru"},{"name":"Yadati Narahari","slug":"yadati-narahari","given":"Yadati","family":"Narahari","affiliation":"Indian Institute of Science , Bengaluru"},{"name":"Soumyarup Sadhukhan","slug":"soumyarup-sadhukhan","given":"Soumyarup","family":"Sadhukhan","affiliation":"Indian Institute of Science , Bengaluru; Indian Institute of Technology , Kanpur"}],"abstract":"We study the problem of allocating indivisible goods among agents in a fair manner. While envy-free allocations of indivisible goods are not guaranteed to exist, envy-freeness can be achieved by additionally providing some subsidy to the agents. These subsidies can be alternatively viewed as a divisible good (money) that is fractionally assigned among the agents to realize an envy-free outcome. In this setup, we bound the subsidy required to attain envy-freeness among agents with dichotomous valuations, i.e., among agents whose marginal value for any good is either zero or one.  \r\n\r\nWe prove that, under dichotomous valuations, there exists an allocation that achieves envy-freeness with a per-agent subsidy of either 0 or 1. Furthermore, such an envy-free solution can be computed efficiently in the standard value-oracle model. Notably, our results hold for general dichotomous valuations and, in particular, do not require the (dichotomous) valuations to be additive, submodular, or even subadditive. Also, our subsidy bounds are tight and provide a linear (in the number of agents) factor improvement over the bounds known for general monotone valuations.","doi":"10.24963/ijcai.2022/9","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2022/9","pdf":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2022/0009.pdf","markdown":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2022/9.md","bibtex":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2022/bibtex/9","volume":{"slug":"2022","title":"Proceedings of the Thirty-First International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence","short_title":"IJCAI 2022","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2022/","year":2022,"location":"Vienna","dates":"23-29 July 2022","editors":"Luc De Raedt","isbn":"978-1-956792-00-3","publisher":"International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization","doi_prefix":"10.24963/ijcai.2022"},"section":"Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems","track":"Main Track","number":9,"pages":{"first":60,"last":66},"keywords":["Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Algorithmic Game Theory","Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Computational Social Choice"],"videos":[{"label":"Video #1","url":"https://slideslive.com/38986511","length_sec":89,"provider":"slideslive"},{"label":"Video #2","url":"https://slideslive.com/38984654","length_sec":339,"provider":"slideslive"}],"references":[{"position":1,"raw":"[Aragones, 1995] Enriqueta Aragones. 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