{"type":"ScholarlyArticle","title":"Fair Division of Indivisible Goods: A Survey","authors":[{"name":"Georgios Amanatidis","slug":"georgios-amanatidis","given":"Georgios","family":"Amanatidis","affiliation":"University of Essex"},{"name":"Georgios Birmpas","slug":"georgios-birmpas","given":"Georgios","family":"Birmpas","affiliation":"Sapienza University of Rome"},{"name":"Aris Filos-Ratsikas","slug":"aris-filos-ratsikas","given":"Aris","family":"Filos-Ratsikas","affiliation":"University of Liverpool"},{"name":"Alexandros A. Voudouris","slug":"alexandros-a-voudouris","given":"Alexandros A.","family":"Voudouris","affiliation":"University of Essex"}],"abstract":"Allocating resources to individuals in a fair manner has been a topic of interest since the ancient times, with most of the early rigorous mathematical work on the problem focusing on infinitely divisible resources. Recently, there has been a surge of papers studying computational questions regarding various different notions of fairness for the indivisible case, like maximin share fairness (MMS) and envy-freeness up to any good (EFX). We survey the most important results in the discrete fair division literature, focusing on the case of additive valuation functions and paying particular attention to the progress made in the last 10 years.","doi":"10.24963/ijcai.2022/756","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2022/756","pdf":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2022/0756.pdf","markdown":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2022/756.md","bibtex":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2022/bibtex/756","volume":{"slug":"2022","title":"Proceedings of the Thirty-First International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence","short_title":"IJCAI 2022","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2022/","year":2022,"location":"Vienna","dates":"23-29 July 2022","editors":"Luc De Raedt","isbn":"978-1-956792-00-3","publisher":"International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization","doi_prefix":"10.24963/ijcai.2022"},"section":"Survey Track","track":"Survey Track","number":756,"pages":{"first":5385,"last":5393},"keywords":["Survey Track: -"],"videos":[{"label":"Video #1","url":"https://slideslive.com/38987293","length_sec":52,"provider":"slideslive"},{"label":"Video #2","url":"https://slideslive.com/38985436","length_sec":547,"provider":"slideslive"}],"references":[{"position":1,"raw":"[Aleksandrov and Walsh, 2020] M. 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