{"type":"ScholarlyArticle","title":"Fair, Individually Rational and Cheap Adjustment","authors":[{"name":"Gleb Polevoy","slug":"gleb-polevoy","given":"Gleb","family":"Polevoy","affiliation":"Paderborn University"},{"name":"Marcin Dziubiński","slug":"marcin-dziubinski","given":"Marcin","family":"Dziubiński","affiliation":"University of Warsaw"}],"abstract":"Consider the practical goal of making a desired action profile played,\r\nwhen the planner can only change the payoffs, bound by \r\nstringent constraints.\r\nApplications include motivating people\r\nto choose the closest school, the closest subway station, or to coordinate\r\non a communication protocol or an investment strategy.\r\nEmploying subsidies and tolls, we adjust the game so that choosing this predefined action profile\r\nbecomes strictly dominant. \r\nInspired mainly by the work of Monderer and Tennenholtz,\r\nwhere the promised subsidies do not materialise in the not played\r\nprofiles, we provide a fair and individually rational game\r\nadjustment, such that the total outside investments sum up\r\nto zero at any profile, thereby facilitating easy and frequent\r\nusage of our adjustment without bearing costs, even if some\r\nplayers behave unexpectedly. The resultant action profile itself needs no\r\nadjustment. Importantly, we also prove that our adjustment minimises \r\nthe general transfer among all such adjustments, counting the total subsidising and taxation.","doi":"10.24963/ijcai.2022/64","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2022/64","pdf":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2022/0064.pdf","markdown":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2022/64.md","bibtex":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2022/bibtex/64","volume":{"slug":"2022","title":"Proceedings of the Thirty-First International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence","short_title":"IJCAI 2022","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2022/","year":2022,"location":"Vienna","dates":"23-29 July 2022","editors":"Luc De Raedt","isbn":"978-1-956792-00-3","publisher":"International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization","doi_prefix":"10.24963/ijcai.2022"},"section":"Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems","track":"Main Track","number":64,"pages":{"first":447,"last":453},"keywords":["Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Algorithmic Game Theory","Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Noncooperative Games"],"videos":[{"label":"Video #1","url":"https://slideslive.com/38986902","length_sec":94,"provider":"slideslive"},{"label":"Video #2","url":"https://slideslive.com/38985045","length_sec":334,"provider":"slideslive"}],"references":[{"position":1,"raw":"[Augustine et al., 2015] John E. 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