{"type":"ScholarlyArticle","title":"On Discrete Truthful Heterogeneous Two-Facility Location","authors":[{"name":"Panagiotis Kanellopoulos","slug":"panagiotis-kanellopoulos","given":"Panagiotis","family":"Kanellopoulos","affiliation":"School of Computer Science and Electronic Engineering , University of Essex , UK"},{"name":"Alexandros A. Voudouris","slug":"alexandros-a-voudouris","given":"Alexandros A.","family":"Voudouris","affiliation":"School of Computer Science and Electronic Engineering , University of Essex , UK"},{"name":"Rongsen Zhang","slug":"rongsen-zhang","given":"Rongsen","family":"Zhang","affiliation":"School of Computer Science and Electronic Engineering , University of Essex , UK"}],"abstract":"We revisit the discrete heterogeneous two-facility location problem, in which there is a set of agents that occupy nodes of a line graph, and have private approval preferences over two facilities. When the facilities are located at some nodes of the line, each agent derives a cost that is equal to her total distance from the facilities she approves. The goal is to decide where to locate the two facilities, so as to (a) incentivize the agents to truthfully report their preferences, and (b) achieve a good approximation of the minimum total (social) cost or the maximum cost among all agents. For both objectives, we design deterministic strategyproof mechanisms with approximation ratios that significantly outperform the state-of-the-art, and complement these results with (almost) tight lower bounds.","doi":"10.24963/ijcai.2022/49","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2022/49","pdf":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2022/0049.pdf","markdown":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2022/49.md","bibtex":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2022/bibtex/49","volume":{"slug":"2022","title":"Proceedings of the Thirty-First International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence","short_title":"IJCAI 2022","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2022/","year":2022,"location":"Vienna","dates":"23-29 July 2022","editors":"Luc De Raedt","isbn":"978-1-956792-00-3","publisher":"International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization","doi_prefix":"10.24963/ijcai.2022"},"section":"Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems","track":"Main Track","number":49,"pages":{"first":342,"last":348},"keywords":["Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Computational Social Choice","Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Economic Paradigms, Auctions and Market-Based Systems","Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Mechanism Design"],"videos":[{"label":"Video #1","url":"https://slideslive.com/38986530","length_sec":83,"provider":"slideslive"},{"label":"Video #2","url":"https://slideslive.com/38984673","length_sec":359,"provider":"slideslive"}],"references":[{"position":1,"raw":"[Anastasiadis and Deligkas, 2018] Eleftherios Anastasiadis and Argyrios Deligkas. 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