{"type":"ScholarlyArticle","title":"Efficient Resource Allocation with Secretive Agents","authors":[{"name":"Soroush Ebadian","slug":"soroush-ebadian","given":"Soroush","family":"Ebadian","affiliation":"University of Toronto"},{"name":"Rupert Freeman","slug":"rupert-freeman","given":"Rupert","family":"Freeman","affiliation":"University of Virginia"},{"name":"Nisarg Shah","slug":"nisarg-shah","given":"Nisarg","family":"Shah","affiliation":"University of Toronto"}],"abstract":"We consider the allocation of homogeneous divisible goods to agents with linear additive valuations. Our focus is on the case where some agents are secretive and reveal no preference information, while the remaining agents reveal full preference information. We study distortion, which is the worst-case approximation ratio when maximizing social welfare given such partial information about agent preferences. As a function of the number of secretive agents k relative to the overall number of agents n, we identify the exact distortion for every p-mean welfare function, which includes the utilitarian welfare (p=1), the Nash welfare (p -> 0), and the egalitarian welfare (p -> -Inf).","doi":"10.24963/ijcai.2022/39","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2022/39","pdf":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2022/0039.pdf","markdown":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2022/39.md","bibtex":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2022/bibtex/39","volume":{"slug":"2022","title":"Proceedings of the Thirty-First International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence","short_title":"IJCAI 2022","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2022/","year":2022,"location":"Vienna","dates":"23-29 July 2022","editors":"Luc De Raedt","isbn":"978-1-956792-00-3","publisher":"International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization","doi_prefix":"10.24963/ijcai.2022"},"section":"Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems","track":"Main Track","number":39,"pages":{"first":272,"last":278},"keywords":["Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Computational Social Choice","Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Resource Allocation"],"videos":[{"label":"Video #1","url":"https://slideslive.com/38986773","length_sec":88,"provider":"slideslive"},{"label":"Video #2","url":"https://slideslive.com/38984916","length_sec":320,"provider":"slideslive"}],"references":[{"position":1,"raw":"[Amanatidis et al., 2021] Georgios Amanatidis, Georgios Birmpas, Aris Filos-Ratsikas, and Alexandros A Voudouris. 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