{"type":"ScholarlyArticle","title":"Incentives in Social Decision Schemes with Pairwise Comparison Preferences","authors":[{"name":"Felix Brandt","slug":"felix-brandt","given":"Felix","family":"Brandt","affiliation":"Technische Universität München"},{"name":"Patrick Lederer","slug":"patrick-lederer","given":"Patrick","family":"Lederer","affiliation":"Technische Universität München"},{"name":"Warut Suksompong","slug":"warut-suksompong","given":"Warut","family":"Suksompong","affiliation":"National University of Singapore"}],"abstract":"Social decision schemes (SDSs) map the preferences of individual voters over multiple alternatives to a probability distribution over the alternatives. In order to study properties such as efficiency, strategyproofness, and participation for SDSs, preferences over alternatives are typically lifted to preferences over lotteries using the notion of stochastic dominance (SD). However, requiring strategyproofness or strict participation with respect to this preference extension only leaves room for rather undesirable SDSs such as random dictatorships. Hence, we focus on the natural but little understood pairwise comparison (PC) preference extension, which postulates that one lottery is preferred to another if the former is more likely to return a preferred outcome. In particular, we settle three open questions raised by Brandt in Rolling the dice: Recent results in probabilistic social choice (2017): (i) there is no Condorcet-consistent SDS that satisfies PC-strategyproofness; (ii) there is no anonymous and neutral SDS that satisfies PC-efficiency and PC-strategyproofness; and (iii) there is no anonymous and neutral SDS that satisfies PC-efficiency and strict PC-participation. All three impossibilities require m>=4 alternatives and turn into possibilities when m<=3.","doi":"10.24963/ijcai.2022/19","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2022/19","pdf":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2022/0019.pdf","markdown":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2022/19.md","bibtex":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2022/bibtex/19","volume":{"slug":"2022","title":"Proceedings of the Thirty-First International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence","short_title":"IJCAI 2022","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2022/","year":2022,"location":"Vienna","dates":"23-29 July 2022","editors":"Luc De Raedt","isbn":"978-1-956792-00-3","publisher":"International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization","doi_prefix":"10.24963/ijcai.2022"},"section":"Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems","track":"Main Track","number":19,"pages":{"first":130,"last":136},"keywords":["Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Computational Social Choice"],"videos":[{"label":"Video #1","url":"https://slideslive.com/38986752","length_sec":90,"provider":"slideslive"},{"label":"Video #2","url":"https://slideslive.com/38984895","length_sec":352,"provider":"slideslive"}],"references":[{"position":1,"raw":"[Allais, 1953] Maurice Allais. Le comportement de l'homme rationnel devant le risque: Critique des postulats et axiomes de l'ecole americaine. Econometrica, 21(4):503-546, 1953.","title":"Le comportement de l'homme rationnel devant le risque: Critique des postulats et axiomes de l'ecole americaine","authors":"Allais","year":"1953","venue":"Econometrica","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":2,"raw":"[Anand, 2009] Paul Anand. Rationality and intransitive pref- erence: Foundations for the modern view. In Paul Anand, Prasanta Pattanaik, and Clemens Puppe, editors, The Hand- book of Rational and Social Choice, chapter 6. Oxford University Press, 2009.","title":"Rationality and intransitive preference: Foundations for the modern view","authors":"Paul Anand","year":"2009","venue":"The Handbook of Rational and Social Choice","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":3,"raw":"[Aziz et al., 2015] Haris Aziz, Florian Brandl, and Fe- lix Brandt. Universal Pareto dominance and welfare for plausible utility functions. Journal of Mathematical Eco- nomics, 60:123-133, 2015.","title":"Universal Pareto dominance and welfare for plausible utility functions","authors":"Haris Aziz, Florian Brandl, Felix Brandt","year":"2015","venue":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":4,"raw":"[Aziz et al., 2018] Haris Aziz, Florian Brandl, Felix Brandt, and Markus Brill. On the tradeoff between efficiency and strategyproofness. Games and Economic Behavior, 110:1- 18, 2018.","title":"On the tradeoff between efficiency and strategyproofness","authors":"Haris Aziz, Florian Brandl, Felix Brandt, Markus Brill","year":"2018","venue":"Games and Economic Behavior","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":5,"raw":"[Blavatskyy, 2006] Pavlo R. Blavatskyy. Axiomatization of a preference for most probable winner. Theory and Decision, 60(1):17-33, 2006.","title":"Axiomatization of a preference for most probable winner","authors":"R Pavlo, Blavatskyy","year":"2006","venue":"Theory and Decision","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":6,"raw":"[Blyth, 1972] Colin R. Blyth. Some probability paradoxes in choice from among random alternatives. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 67(338):366-373, 1972.","title":"Some probability paradoxes in choice from among random alternatives","authors":"Colin R Blyth","year":"1972","venue":"Journal of the American Statistical Association","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":7,"raw":"[Bogomolnaia and Moulin, 2001] Anna Bogomolnaia and Hervé Moulin. A new solution to the random assignment problem. Journal of Economic Theory, 100(2):295-328, 2001.","title":"A new solution to the random assignment problem","authors":"Anna Bogomolnaia, Hervé Moulin","year":"2001","venue":"Journal of Economic Theory","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":8,"raw":"[Brandl and Brandt, 2020] Florian Brandl and Felix Brandt. Arrovian aggregation of convex preferences. Econometrica, 88(2):799-844, 2020.","title":"Arrovian aggregation of convex preferences","authors":"Brandt Brandl, Florian Brandl, Felix Brandt","year":"2020","venue":"Econometrica","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":9,"raw":"[Brandl et al., 2015] Florian Brandl, Felix Brandt, and Jo- hannes Hofbauer. Incentives for participation and absten- tion in probabilistic social choice. In Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 1411-1419, 2015.","title":"Incentives for participation and abstention in probabilistic social choice","authors":"Brandl","year":"2015","venue":"Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS)","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":10,"raw":"[Brandl et al., 2016a] Florian Brandl, Felix Brandt, and Hans Georg Seedig. Consistent probabilistic social choice. Econometrica, 84(5):1839-1880, 2016.","title":"Consistent probabilistic social choice","authors":"Brandl","year":"2016","venue":"Econometrica","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":11,"raw":"[Brandl et al., 2016b] Florian Brandl, Felix Brandt, and Warut Suksompong. The impossibility of extending ran- dom dictatorship to weak preferences. Economics Letters, 141:44-47, 2016.","title":"The impossibility of extending random dictatorship to weak preferences","authors":"Brandl","year":"2016","venue":"Economics Letters","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":12,"raw":"[Brandl et al., 2018] Florian Brandl, Felix Brandt, Manuel Eberl, and Christian Geist. Proving the incompatibility of efficiency and strategyproofness via SMT solving. Journal of the ACM, 65(2):1-28, 2018.","title":"Proving the incompatibility of efficiency and strategyproofness via SMT solving","authors":"Florian Brandl, Felix Brandt, Manuel Eberl, Christian Geist","year":"2018","venue":"Journal of the ACM","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":13,"raw":"[Brandl et al., 2019] Florian Brandl, Felix Brandt, and Jo- hannes Hofbauer. Welfare maximization entices partici- pation. Games and Economic Behavior, 14:308-314, 2019.","title":"Welfare maximization entices participation","authors":"Brandl","year":"2019","venue":"Games and Economic Behavior","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":14,"raw":"[Brandl et al., 2022] Florian Brandl, Felix Brandt, and Chris- tian Stricker. An analytical and experimental comparison of maximal lottery schemes. Social Choice and Welfare, 58(1):5-38, 2022.","title":"An analytical and experimental comparison of maximal lottery schemes","authors":"Brandl","year":"2022","venue":"Social Choice and Welfare","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":"/proceedings/2018/16"},{"position":15,"raw":"[Brandt et al., 2016] Felix Brandt, Vincent Conitzer, Ulle En- driss, Jérôme Lang, and Ariel Procaccia, editors. Handbook of Computational Social Choice. Cambridge University Press, 2016.","title":"Handbook of Computational Social Choice","authors":null,"year":"2016","venue":null,"doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":16,"raw":"[Brandt et al., 2022] Felix Brandt, Patrick Lederer, and Warut Suksompong. Incentives in social decision schemes with pairwise comparison preferences. Technical Report, https://arxiv.org/abs/2204.12436, 2022.","title":"Incentives in social decision schemes with pairwise comparison preferences","authors":"Felix Brandt, Patrick Lederer, Warut Suksompong","year":null,"venue":null,"doi":null,"url":"https://arxiv.org/abs/2204.12436,2022","internal_url":null},{"position":17,"raw":"[Brandt, 2017] Felix Brandt. Rolling the dice: Recent results in probabilistic social choice. In Ulle Endriss, editor, Trends in Computational Social Choice, chapter 1, pages 3-26. AI Access, 2017.","title":"Rolling the dice: Recent results in probabilistic social choice","authors":"Felix Brandt, Brandt","year":"2017","venue":"Trends in Computational Social Choice","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":18,"raw":"[Fishburn, 1982] Peter C. Fishburn. Nontransitive measurable utility. Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 26(1):31-67, 1982.","title":"Nontransitive measurable utility","authors":"C Peter, Fishburn","year":"1982","venue":"Journal of Mathematical Psychology","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":19,"raw":"[Fishburn, 1984a] Peter C. Fishburn. Dominance in SSB util- ity theory. Journal of Economic Theory, 34(1):130-148, 1984.","title":"Dominance in SSB utility theory","authors":"Peter C Fishburn, Fishburn","year":"1984","venue":"Journal of Economic Theory","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":20,"raw":"[Fishburn, 1984b] Peter C. Fishburn. Probabilistic social choice based on simple voting comparisons. Review of Economic Studies, 51(4):683-692, 1984.","title":"Probabilistic social choice based on simple voting comparisons","authors":"Peter C Fishburn, Fishburn","year":"1984","venue":"Review of Economic Studies","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":21,"raw":"[Gibbard, 1973] Allan Gibbard. Manipulation of voting schemes: A general result. Econometrica, 41(4):587-601, 1973.","title":"Manipulation of voting schemes: A general result","authors":"Allan Gibbard","year":"1973","venue":"Econometrica","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":22,"raw":"[Gibbard, 1977] Allan Gibbard. Manipulation of schemes that mix voting with chance. Econometrica, 45(3):665- 681, 1977.","title":"Manipulation of schemes that mix voting with chance","authors":"Allan Gibbard","year":"1977","venue":"Econometrica","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":23,"raw":"[Hoang, 2017] Lê Nguyên Hoang. Strategy-proofness of the randomized Condorcet voting system. Social Choice and Welfare, 48(3):679-701, 2017.","title":"Strategy-proofness of the randomized Condorcet voting system","authors":"Nguyên Lê, Hoang","year":"2017","venue":"Social Choice and Welfare","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":24,"raw":"[Kahneman and Tversky, 1979] Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky. Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk. Econometrica, 47(2):263-292, 1979.","title":"Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk","authors":"Tversky Kahneman, Daniel Kahneman, Amos Tversky","year":"1979","venue":"Econometrica","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":25,"raw":"[Moulin, 1988] Hervé. Moulin. Condorcet's principle im- plies the no show paradox. Journal of Economic Theory, 45(1):53-64, 1988.","title":"Condorcet's principle implies the no show paradox","authors":"Hervé, Moulin","year":"1988","venue":"Journal of Economic Theory","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":26,"raw":"[Nisan et al., 2007] Noam Nisan, Tim Roughgarden, Éva Tar- dos, and Vijay V. Vazirani. Algorithmic Game Theory. Cambridge University Press, 2007.","title":"Algorithmic Game Theory","authors":"Nisan","year":"2007","venue":null,"doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":27,"raw":"[Packard, 1982] Dennis J. Packard. Cyclical preference logic. Theory and Decision, 14(4):415-426, 1982.","title":"Cyclical preference logic","authors":"J Dennis, Packard","year":"1982","venue":"Theory and Decision","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":28,"raw":"[Satterthwaite, 1975] Mark Allen Satterthwaite. Strategy- proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and corre- spondence theorems for voting procedures and social wel- fare functions. Journal of Economic Theory, 10(2):187- 217, 1975.","title":"Strategyproofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions","authors":"Mark Allen, Satterthwaite","year":"1975","venue":"Journal of Economic Theory","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":29,"raw":"[Shoham and Leyton-Brown, 2009] Yoav Shoham and Kevin Leyton-Brown. Multiagent Systems: Algorithmic, Game-Theoretic, and Logical Foundations. Cambridge University Press, 2009.","title":"Multiagent Systems: Algorithmic, Game-Theoretic, and Logical Foundations","authors":"Yoav Shoham, Kevin Leyton-Brown","year":"2009","venue":null,"doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null}],"license_note":"Copyright International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence."}