{"type":"ScholarlyArticle","title":"Distortion in Voting with Top-t Preferences","authors":[{"name":"Allan Borodin","slug":"allan-borodin","given":"Allan","family":"Borodin","affiliation":"University of Toronto"},{"name":"Daniel Halpern","slug":"daniel-halpern","given":"Daniel","family":"Halpern","affiliation":"Harvard University"},{"name":"Mohamad Latifian","slug":"mohamad-latifian","given":"Mohamad","family":"Latifian","affiliation":"University of Toronto"},{"name":"Nisarg Shah","slug":"nisarg-shah","given":"Nisarg","family":"Shah","affiliation":"University of Toronto"}],"abstract":"A fundamental question in social choice and multi-agent systems is aggregating ordinal preferences expressed by agents into a measurably prudent collective choice. A promising line of recent work views ordinal preferences as a proxy for underlying cardinal preferences. It aims to optimize distortion, the worst-case approximation ratio of the (utilitarian) social welfare. When agents rank the set of alternatives, prior work identifies near-optimal voting rules for selecting one or more alternatives. However, ranking all the alternatives is prohibitive when there are many alternatives. \r\n\r\nIn this work, we consider the setting where each agent ranks only her t favorite alternatives and identify almost tight bounds on the best possible distortion when selecting a single alternative or a committee of alternatives of a given size k. Our results also extend to approximating higher moments of social welfare. Along the way, we close a gap left open in prior work by identifying asymptotically tight distortion bounds for committee selection given full rankings.","doi":"10.24963/ijcai.2022/17","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2022/17","pdf":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2022/0017.pdf","markdown":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2022/17.md","bibtex":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2022/bibtex/17","volume":{"slug":"2022","title":"Proceedings of the Thirty-First International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence","short_title":"IJCAI 2022","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2022/","year":2022,"location":"Vienna","dates":"23-29 July 2022","editors":"Luc De Raedt","isbn":"978-1-956792-00-3","publisher":"International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization","doi_prefix":"10.24963/ijcai.2022"},"section":"Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems","track":"Main Track","number":17,"pages":{"first":116,"last":122},"keywords":["Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Computational Social Choice"],"videos":[{"label":"Video #1","url":"https://slideslive.com/38986772","length_sec":82,"provider":"slideslive"},{"label":"Video #2","url":"https://slideslive.com/38984915","length_sec":353,"provider":"slideslive"}],"references":[{"position":1,"raw":"[Amanatidis et al., 2021] Georgios Amanatidis, Georgios Birmpas, Aris Filos-Ratsikas, and Alexandros A Voudouris. Peeking behind the ordinal curtain: Improving distortion via cardinal queries. Artificial Intelligence, 296:103488, 2021.","title":"Peeking behind the ordinal curtain: Improving distortion via cardinal queries","authors":"Georgios Amanatidis, Georgios Birmpas, Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Alexandros A Voudouris","year":"2021","venue":"Artificial Intelligence","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":2,"raw":"[Anagnostides et al., 2021] Ioannis Anagnostides, Dimitris Fo- takis, and Panagiotis Patsilinakos. Metric-distortion bounds un- der limited information. In Proc. of 14th SAGT, pages 299-313, 2021.","title":"Metric-distortion bounds under limited information","authors":"Ioannis Anagnostides, Dimitris Fotakis, Panagiotis Patsilinakos","year":"2021","venue":"Proc. of 14th SAGT","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":3,"raw":"[Anshelevich et al., 2021] Elliot Anshelevich, Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Nisarg Shah, and Alexandros A. Voudouris. Distortion in social choice problems: The first 15 years and beyond. In Proc. of 30th IJCAI, pages 4294-4301, 2021. Survey Track.","title":"Distortion in social choice problems: The first 15 years and beyond","authors":"Anshelevich","year":"2021","venue":"Proc. of 30th IJCAI","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":"/proceedings/2021/589"},{"position":4,"raw":"[Arrow, 1951] Kenneth Arrow. Social Choice and Individual Val- ues. Wiley, 1951.","title":"Social Choice and Individual Values","authors":"Kenneth Arrow","year":"1951","venue":null,"doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":5,"raw":"[Aziz, 2020] Haris Aziz. Justifications of welfare guarantees un- der normalized utilities. ACM SIGecom Exchanges, 17(2):71-75, 2020.","title":"Justifications of welfare guarantees under normalized utilities","authors":"Haris Aziz","year":"2020","venue":"ACM SIGecom Exchanges","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":6,"raw":"[Benade et al., 2021] Gerdus Benade, Swaprava Nath, Ariel D. Procaccia, and Nisarg Shah. Preference elicitation for participa- tory budgeting. Management Science, 67(5):2813-2827, 2021.","title":"Preference elicitation for participatory budgeting","authors":"Benade","year":"2021","venue":"Management Science","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":7,"raw":"[Bentham, 1780] Jeremy Bentham. An Introduction to the Princi- ples of Morals and Legislation. Dover Publications, 1780.","title":"An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation","authors":"Jeremy Bentham","year":"1780","venue":null,"doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":8,"raw":"[Borodin et al., 2019] Allan Borodin, Omer Lev, Nisarg Shah, and Tyrone Strangway. Primarily about primaries. In Proc. of 33rd AAAI, pages 1804-1811, 2019.","title":"Primarily about primaries","authors":"Allan Borodin, Omer Lev, Nisarg Shah, Tyrone Strangway","year":"2019","venue":"Proc. of 33rd AAAI","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":9,"raw":"[Boutilier et al., 2015] Craig Boutilier, Ioannis Caragiannis, Simir Haber, Tyler Lu, Ariel D. Procaccia, and Or Sheffet. Optimal social choice functions: A utilitarian view. Artificial Intelligence, 227:190-213, 2015.","title":"Optimal social choice functions: A utilitarian view","authors":"Craig Boutilier, Ioannis Caragiannis, Simir Haber, Tyler Lu, Ariel D Procaccia, Or Sheffet","year":"2015","venue":"Artificial Intelligence","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":10,"raw":"[Brill, 2019] Markus Brill. Interactive democracy: New challenges for social choice theory. In The Future of Economic Design, pages 59-66. Springer, 2019.","title":"Interactive democracy: New challenges for social choice theory","authors":"Markus Brill, Brill","year":"2019","venue":"The Future of Economic Design","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":11,"raw":"[Budish et al., 2013] Eric Budish, Yeon-Koo Che, Fuhito Kojima, and Paul Milgrom. Designing random allocation mecha- nisms: Theory and applications. American economic review, 103(2):585-623, 2013.","title":"Designing random allocation mechanisms: Theory and applications","authors":"Eric Budish, Yeon-Koo Che, Fuhito Kojima, Paul Milgrom","year":"2013","venue":"American economic review","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":12,"raw":"[Caragiannis et al., 2017] Ioannis Caragiannis, Swaprava Nath, Ariel D. Procaccia, and Nisarg Shah. Subset selection via im- plicit utilitarian voting. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Re- search, 58:123-152, 2017.","title":"Subset selection via implicit utilitarian voting","authors":"Ioannis Caragiannis, Swaprava Nath, Ariel D Procaccia, Nisarg Shah","year":"2017","venue":"Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":"/proceedings/2016/29"},{"position":13,"raw":"[Cheng et al., 2020] Yu Cheng, Zhihao Jiang, Kamesh Munagala, and Kangning Wang. Group fairness in committee selection. ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC), 8(4):1-18, 2020.","title":"Group fairness in committee selection","authors":"Yu Cheng, Zhihao Jiang, Kamesh Munagala, Kangning Wang","year":"2020","venue":"ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC)","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":14,"raw":"[Condorcet, 1785] Marquis de Condorcet. Essai sur l'application de l'analyse à la probabilité de décisions rendues à la pluralité de voix. Imprimerie Royal, 1785. Facsimile published in 1972 by Chelsea Publishing Company, New York.","title":"Marquis de Condorcet. Essai sur l'application de l'analyse à la probabilité de décisions rendues à la pluralité de voix","authors":"Condorcet","year":"1785","venue":null,"doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":15,"raw":"[Drummond and Boutilier, 2013] Joanna Drummond and Craig Boutilier. Elicitation and approximately stable matching with partial preferences. In Proc. of 23rd IJCAI, pages 97-105, 2013.","title":"Elicitation and approximately stable matching with partial preferences","authors":"Joanna Drummond, Craig Boutilier","year":"2013","venue":"Proc. of 23rd IJCAI","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":"/proceedings/2013/26"},{"position":16,"raw":"[Dwork et al., 2001] Cynthia Dwork, Ravi Kumar, Moni Naor, and Dandapani Sivakumar. Rank aggregation methods for the web. In Proc. of 10th WWW, pages 613-622, 2001.","title":"Rank aggregation methods for the web","authors":"Cynthia Dwork, Ravi Kumar, Moni Naor, Dandapani Sivakumar","year":"2001","venue":"Proc. of 10th WWW","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":17,"raw":"[Ebadian et al., 2022] Soroush Ebadian, Anson Kahng, Dominik Peters, and Nisarg Shah. Optimized fairness and distortion in voting. In Proc. of 23rd EC, 2022. Available at https://arxiv.org/ abs/2205.15760.","title":"Optimized fairness and distortion in voting","authors":"Anson Soroush Ebadian, Dominik Kahng, Nisarg Peters, Shah","year":"2022","venue":"Proc. of 23rd EC","doi":null,"url":"https://arxiv.org/abs/2205.15760","internal_url":null},{"position":18,"raw":"[Ephrati and Rosenschein, 1997] Eithan Ephrati and Jeffrey S. Rosenschein. A heuristic technique for multi-agent planning. Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence, 20(1):13-67, 1997.","title":"A heuristic technique for multi-agent planning","authors":"Eithan Ephrati, Jeffrey S Rosenschein","year":"1997","venue":"Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":19,"raw":"[Fain et al., 2017] Brandon Fain, Ashish Goel, Kamesh Munagala, and Sukolsak Sakshuwong. Sequential deliberation for social choice. In Proc. of 13th WINE, pages 177-190, 2017.","title":"Sequential deliberation for social choice","authors":"Brandon Fain, Ashish Goel, Kamesh Munagala, Sukolsak Sakshuwong","year":"2017","venue":"Proc. of 13th WINE","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":20,"raw":"[Fain et al., 2020] Brandon Fain, William Fan, and Kamesh Muna- gala. Concentration of distortion: The value of extra voters in randomized social choice. In Proc. of 29th IJCAI, pages 110- 116, 7 2020.","title":"Concentration of distortion: The value of extra voters in randomized social choice","authors":"Brandon Fain, William Fan, Kamesh Munagala","year":"2020","venue":"Proc. of 29th IJCAI","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":"/proceedings/2020/16"},{"position":21,"raw":"[Filmus and Oren, 2014] Yuval Filmus and Joel Oren. Efficient vot- ing via the top-k elicitation scheme: a probabilistic approach. In Proc. of 15th EC, pages 295-312, 2014.","title":"Efficient voting via the top-k elicitation scheme: a probabilistic approach","authors":"Oren ; ] Yuval Filmus, Joel Filmus, Oren","year":"2014","venue":"Proc. of 15th EC","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":22,"raw":"[Filos-Ratsikas et al., 2019] Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Evi Micha, and Alexandros A. Voudouris. The distortion of distributed voting. In Proc. of 12th SAGT, pages 312-325. Springer, 2019.","title":"The distortion of distributed voting","authors":"Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Evi Micha, Alexandros A Voudouris","year":"2019","venue":"Proc. of 12th SAGT","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":23,"raw":"[Flanigan et al., 2021] Bailey Flanigan, Paul Gölz, Anupam Gupta, Brett Hennig, and Ariel D. Procaccia. Fair algorithms for select- ing citizens' assemblies. Nature, 596(7873):548-552, 2021.","title":"Fair algorithms for selecting citizens' assemblies","authors":"Bailey Flanigan, Paul Gölz, Anupam Gupta, Brett Hennig, Ariel D Procaccia","year":"2021","venue":"Nature","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":24,"raw":"[Gkatzelis et al., 2020] Vasilis Gkatzelis, Daniel Halpern, and Nis- arg Shah. Resolving the optimal metric distortion conjecture. In Proc. of 61st FOCS, pages 1427-1438. IEEE, 2020.","title":"Resolving the optimal metric distortion conjecture","authors":"Vasilis Gkatzelis, Daniel Halpern, Nisarg Shah","year":"2020","venue":"Proc. of 61st FOCS","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":25,"raw":"[Gross et al., 2017] Stephen Gross, Elliot Anshelevich, and Lirong Xia. Vote until two of you agree: Mechanisms with small distor- tion and sample complexity. In Proc. of 31st AAAI, 2017.","title":"Vote until two of you agree: Mechanisms with small distortion and sample complexity","authors":"Gross","year":"2017","venue":"Proc. of 31st AAAI","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":26,"raw":"[Halpern and Shah, 2021] Daniel Halpern and Nisarg Shah. Fair and efficient resource allocation with partial information. In Proc. of 30th IJCAI, pages 224-230, 2021.","title":"Fair and efficient resource allocation with partial information","authors":"Daniel Halpern, Nisarg Shah","year":"2021","venue":"Proc. of 30th IJCAI","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":"/proceedings/2021/32"},{"position":27,"raw":"[Haynes et al., 1997] Thomas Haynes, Sandip Sen, Neeraj Arora, and Rajani Nadella. An automated meeting scheduling system that utilizes user preferences. In Proc. of 1st AGENTS, pages 308-315, 1997.","title":"An automated meeting scheduling system that utilizes user preferences","authors":"Thomas Haynes, Sandip Sen, Neeraj Arora, Rajani Nadella","year":"1997","venue":"Proc. of 1st AGENTS","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":28,"raw":"[Hosseini et al., 2021] Hadi Hosseini, Vijay Menon, Nisarg Shah, and Sujoy Sikdar. Necessarily optimal one-sided matchings. In Proc. of 35th AAAI, pages 5481-5488, 2021.","title":"Necessarily optimal one-sided matchings","authors":"Hadi Hosseini, Vijay Menon, Nisarg Shah, Sujoy Sikdar","year":"2021","venue":"Proc. of 35th AAAI","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":29,"raw":"[Kempe, 2020a] David Kempe. An analysis framework for metric voting based on lp duality. In Proc. of 34th AAAI, pages 2079- 2086, 2020.","title":"An analysis framework for metric voting based on lp duality","authors":"; Kempe, David Kempe","year":"2020","venue":"Proc. of 34th AAAI","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":30,"raw":"[Kempe, 2020b] David Kempe. Communication, distortion, and randomness in metric voting. In Proc. of 34th AAAI, pages 2087- 2094, 2020.","title":"Communication, distortion, and randomness in metric voting","authors":"David Kempe, Kempe","year":"2020","venue":"Proc. of 34th AAAI","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":31,"raw":"[Lang and Xia, 2016] Jérôme Lang and Lirong Xia. Voting in com- binatorial domains. In Felix Brandt, Vincent Conitzer, Ulle En- driss, Jérôme Lang, and Ariel D. Procaccia, editors, Handbook of Computational Social Choice, chapter 9, pages 197-222. Cam- bridge University Press, 2016.","title":"Voting in combinatorial domains","authors":"Lang, Xia ;, Jérôme Lang, Lirong Xia","year":"2016","venue":"Handbook of Computational Social Choice","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":32,"raw":"[Lee et al., 2014] David T. Lee, Ashish Goel, Tanja Aitamurto, and Hélène Landemore. Crowdsourcing for participatory democra- cies: Efficient elicitation of social choice functions. In Proc. of 2nd AAAI Conference on Human Computation and Crowdsourc- ing (HCOMP), pages 133-142, 2014.","title":"Crowdsourcing for participatory democracies: Efficient elicitation of social choice functions","authors":"David T Lee, Ashish Goel, Tanja Aitamurto, Hélène Landemore","year":"2014","venue":"Proc. of 2nd AAAI Conference on Human Computation and Crowdsourcing (HCOMP)","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":33,"raw":"[Lesser et al., 2003] Victor Lesser, Charles L. Ortiz Jr., and Milind Tambe. Distributed sensor networks: A multiagent perspective, volume 9. Springer Science & Business Media, 2003.","title":"Distributed sensor networks: A multiagent perspective","authors":"Victor Lesser, Charles L Ortiz, Milind Tambe","year":"2003","venue":null,"doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":34,"raw":"[Lu and Boutilier, 2011] Tyler Lu and Craig Boutilier. Vote elicita- tion with probabilistic preference models: Empirical estimation and cost tradeoffs. In Proc. of 2nd ADT, pages 135-149, 2011.","title":"Vote elicitation with probabilistic preference models: Empirical estimation and cost tradeoffs","authors":"Tyler Lu, Craig Boutilier","year":"2011","venue":"Proc. of 2nd ADT","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":35,"raw":"[Mandal et al., 2019] Debmalya Mandal, Ariel D. Procaccia, Nis- arg Shah, and David P. Woodruff. Efficient and thrifty voting by any means necessary. In Proc. of 33rd NIPS, pages 7178-7189, 2019.","title":"Efficient and thrifty voting by any means necessary","authors":"Mandal","year":"2019","venue":"Proc. of 33rd NIPS","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":36,"raw":"[Mandal et al., 2020] Debmalya Mandal, Nisarg Shah, and David P. Woodruff. Optimal communication-distortion tradeoff in voting. In Proc. of 21st EC, pages 795-813, 2020.","title":"Optimal communication-distortion tradeoff in voting","authors":"Mandal","year":"2020","venue":"Proc. of 21st EC","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":37,"raw":"[Oren et al., 2013] Joel Oren, Yuval Filmus, and Craig Boutilier. Efficient vote elicitation under candidate uncertainty. In Proc. of 23rd AAAI, 2013.","title":"Efficient vote elicitation under candidate uncertainty","authors":"Joel Oren, Yuval Filmus, Craig Boutilier","year":"2013","venue":"Proc. of 23rd AAAI","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":"/proceedings/2013/54"},{"position":38,"raw":"[Pitt et al., 2006] Jeremy Pitt, Lloyd Kamara, Marek Sergot, and Alexander Artikis. Voting in multi-agent systems. The Computer Journal, 49(2):156-170, 2006.","title":"Voting in multi-agent systems","authors":"Jeremy Pitt, Lloyd Kamara, Marek Sergot, Alexander Artikis","year":"2006","venue":"The Computer Journal","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":39,"raw":"[Procaccia and Rosenschein, 2006] Ariel D. Procaccia and Jef- frey S. Rosenschein. The distortion of cardinal preferences in voting. In Proc. of 10th CIA, pages 317-331, 2006.","title":"The distortion of cardinal preferences in voting","authors":"Ariel D Procaccia, Jeffrey S Rosenschein","year":"2006","venue":"Proc. of 10th CIA","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":40,"raw":"[Procaccia et al., 2012] Ariel D. Procaccia, Sashank J. Reddi, and Nisarg Shah. A maximum likelihood approach for selecting sets of alternatives. In Proc. of 28th UAI, pages 695-704, 2012.","title":"A maximum likelihood approach for selecting sets of alternatives","authors":"Ariel D Procaccia, J Sashank, Nisarg Reddi, Shah","year":"2012","venue":"Proc. of 28th UAI","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":41,"raw":"[Shoham and Leyton-Brown, 2008] Yoav Shoham and Kevin Leyton-Brown. Multiagent systems: Algorithmic, game- theoretic, and logical foundations. Cambridge University Press, 2008.","title":"Multiagent systems: Algorithmic, gametheoretic, and logical foundations","authors":"Yoav Shoham, Kevin Leyton-Brown","year":"2008","venue":null,"doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null}],"license_note":"Copyright International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence."}