---
title: "Nash Welfare in the Facility Location Problem"
authors:
  - "Alexander Lam"
doi: "10.24963/ijcai.2021/680"
url: "https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2021/680"
pdf: "https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2021/0680.pdf"
venue: "Proceedings of the Thirtieth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence"
year: 2021
pages: "4897-4898"
track: "Doctoral Consortium"
keywords:
  - "Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Algorithmic Game Theory"
  - "Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Computational Social Choice"
  - "Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Voting"
  - "Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Economic Paradigms, Auctions and Market-Based Systems"
---

# Nash Welfare in the Facility Location Problem

Alexander Lam

*Proceedings of the Thirtieth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence*, pages 4897-4898. DOI: [10.24963/ijcai.2021/680](https://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2021/680)

## Abstract

In most facility location research, either an efficient facility placement which minimizes the total cost or a fairer placement which minimizes the maximum cost are typically proposed. To find a solution that is both fair and efficient, we propose converting the agent costs to utilities and placing the facility/ies such that the product of utilities, also known as the Nash welfare, is maximized. We ask whether the Nash welfare's well-studied balance between fairness and efficiency also applies to the facility location setting, and what agent strategic behaviour may occur under this facility placement.