{"type":"ScholarlyArticle","title":"Fair and Efficient Resource Allocation with Partial Information","authors":[{"name":"Daniel Halpern","slug":"daniel-halpern","given":"Daniel","family":"Halpern","affiliation":""},{"name":"Nisarg Shah","slug":"nisarg-shah","given":"Nisarg","family":"Shah","affiliation":""}],"abstract":"We study the fundamental problem of allocating indivisible goods to agents with additive preferences. We consider eliciting from each agent only a ranking of her k most preferred goods instead of her full cardinal valuations. We characterize the amount of preference information that must be elicited in order to satisfy envy-freeness up to one good and approximate maximin share guarantee, two widely studied fairness notions. We also analyze the multiplicative loss in social welfare incurred due to the lack of full information with and without fairness requirements.","doi":"10.24963/ijcai.2021/32","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2021/32","pdf":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2021/0032.pdf","markdown":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2021/32.md","bibtex":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2021/bibtex/32","volume":{"slug":"2021","title":"Proceedings of the Thirtieth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence","short_title":"IJCAI 2021","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2021/","year":2021,"location":"Montreal","dates":"19-27 August 2021","editors":"Prof. Zhi-Hua Zhou","isbn":"978-0-9992411-9-6","publisher":"International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization","doi_prefix":"10.24963/ijcai.2021"},"section":"Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems","track":"Main Track","number":32,"pages":{"first":224,"last":230},"keywords":["Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Resource Allocation","Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Computational Social Choice","AI Ethics, Trust, Fairness: Fairness"],"videos":[],"references":[],"license_note":"Copyright International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence."}