{"type":"ScholarlyArticle","title":"Mechanism Design with Uncertainty","authors":[{"name":"Taiki Todo","slug":"taiki-todo","given":"Taiki","family":"Todo","affiliation":"Kyushu University , Japan"}],"abstract":"My research is summarized as mechanism design with uncertainty. Traditional mechanism design focuses on static environments where all the (possibly probabilistic) information about the agents are observable by the mechanism designer. In practice, however, it is possible that the set of participating agents\r\nand/or some of teheir actions are not observable a priori. We therefore focused on various kinds of uncertainty in mechanism design and developed/analyzed several market mechanisms that incentivise agents to behave in a sincere way.","doi":"10.24963/ijcai.2020/730","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2020/730","pdf":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2020/0730.pdf","markdown":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2020/730.md","bibtex":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2020/bibtex/730","volume":{"slug":"2020","title":"Proceedings of the Twenty-Ninth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence","short_title":"IJCAI 2020","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2020/","year":2020,"location":"Yokohama","dates":"January 2021 (postponed from 11-17 July 2020)","editors":"Christian Bessiere","isbn":"978-0-9992411-6-5","publisher":"International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization","doi_prefix":"10.24963/ijcai.2020"},"section":"Early Career","track":"Early Career","number":730,"pages":{"first":5174,"last":5177},"keywords":["Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Algorithmic Game Theory","Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Computational Social Choice","Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Economic Paradigms, Auctions and Market-Based Systems"],"videos":[],"references":[{"position":1,"raw":"[Bikhchandani et al., 2006] Sushil Bikhchandani, Shurojit Chatterji, Ron Lavi, Ahuva Mu'alem, Noam Nisan, and Arunava Sen. Weak monotonicity characterizes determin- istic dominant-strategy implementation. Econometrica, 74(4):1109-1132, 2006.","title":"Weak monotonicity characterizes deterministic dominant-strategy implementation","authors":"Sushil Bikhchandani, Shurojit Chatterji, Ron Lavi, Ahuva Mu'alem, Noam Nisan, Arunava Sen","year":"2006","venue":"Econometrica","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":2,"raw":"[Conitzer, 2008] Vincent Conitzer. Anonymity-proof vot- ing rules. In the Proceedings of the Fourth International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics (WINE- 08), pages 295-306, 2008.","title":"Anonymity-proof voting rules","authors":"Vincent Conitzer","year":"2008","venue":"the Proceedings of the Fourth International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics (WINE-08)","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":3,"raw":"[Fujita et al., 2018] Etsushi Fujita, Julien Lesca, Akihisa Sonoda, Taiki Todo, and Makoto Yokoo. A complexity approach for core-selecting exchange under conditionally lexicographic preferences. Journal of Artificial Intelli- gence Research (JAIR), 63:515-555, 2018.","title":"A complexity approach for core-selecting exchange under conditionally lexicographic preferences","authors":"Etsushi Fujita, Julien Lesca, Akihisa Sonoda, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo","year":"2018","venue":"Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research (JAIR)","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":4,"raw":"[Moulin, 1980] Hervé Moulin. On strategy-proofness and single peakedness. Public Choice, 35(4):437-455, 1980.","title":"On strategy-proofness and single peakedness","authors":"Hervé Moulin","year":"1980","venue":"Public Choice","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":5,"raw":"[Myerson, 1981] Roger B. Myerson. Optimal auction de- sign. Mathematics of Operations Research, 6(1):58-73, 1981.","title":"Optimal auction design","authors":"B Roger, Myerson","year":"1981","venue":"Mathematics of Operations Research","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":6,"raw":"[Nehama et al., 2019] Ilan Nehama, Taiki Todo, and Makoto Yokoo. Manipulations-resistant facility location mecha- nisms for ZV-line graphs. In Proceedings of the 18th In- ternational Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi- Agent Systems (AAMAS-19), pages 1452-1460, 2019.","title":"Manipulations-resistant facility location mechanisms for ZV-line graphs","authors":"Ilan Nehama, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo","year":"2019","venue":"Proceedings of the 18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS-19)","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":7,"raw":"[Okada et al., 2019] Nodoka Okada, Taiki Todo, and Makoto Yokoo. Sat-based automated mechanism design for false- name-proof facility location. In Proceedings of the 22nd International Conference on Principles and Practice of Multi-Agent Systems (PRIMA-19), pages 321-337, 2019.","title":"Sat-based automated mechanism design for falsename-proof facility location","authors":"Nodoka Okada, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo","year":"2019","venue":"Proceedings of the 22nd International Conference on Principles and Practice of Multi-Agent Systems (PRIMA-19)","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":8,"raw":"[Sönmez, 1999] Tayfun Sönmez. Strategy-proofness and es- sentially single-valued cores. Econometrica, 67(3):677- 689, 1999.","title":"Strategy-proofness and essentially single-valued cores","authors":"Tayfun Sönmez, Sönmez","year":"1999","venue":"Econometrica","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":9,"raw":"[Sonoda et al., 2014] Akihisa Sonoda, Etsushi Fujita, Taiki Todo, and Makoto Yokoo. Two case studies for trading multiple indivisible goods with indifferences. In Proceed- ings of the 28th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-14), pages 791-797, 2014.","title":"Two case studies for trading multiple indivisible goods with indifferences","authors":"Akihisa Sonoda, Etsushi Fujita, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo","year":"2014","venue":"Proceedings of the 28th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-14)","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":10,"raw":"[Sonoda et al., 2016] Akihisa Sonoda, Taiki Todo, and Makoto Yokoo. False-name-proof locations of two facili- ties: Economic and algorithmic approaches. In Proceed- ings of the 30th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-16), pages 615-621, 2016.","title":"False-name-proof locations of two facilities: Economic and algorithmic approaches","authors":"Akihisa Sonoda, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo","year":"2016","venue":"Proceedings of the 30th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-16)","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":11,"raw":"[Sun et al., 2015] Zhaohong Sun, Hideaki Hata, Taiki Todo, and Makoto Yokoo. Exchange of indivisible objects with asymmetry. In Proceedings of the 24th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-15), pages 97-103, 2015.","title":"Exchange of indivisible objects with asymmetry","authors":"Sun","year":"2015","venue":"Proceedings of the 24th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-15)","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":"/proceedings/2015/21"},{"position":12,"raw":"[Todo and Conitzer, 2013] Taiki Todo and Vincent Conitzer. False-name-proof matching. In Proceedings of the 12th In- ternational Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi- Agent Systems (AAMAS-13), pages 311-318, 2013.","title":"False-name-proof matching","authors":"Conitzer Todo, Taiki Todo, Vincent Conitzer","year":"2013","venue":"Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS-13)","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":13,"raw":"[Todo et al., 2009] Taiki Todo, Atsushi Iwasaki, Makoto Yokoo, and Yuko Sakurai. Characterizing false-name- proof allocation rules in combinatorial auctions. In Pro- ceedings of the Eighth International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS-09), pages 265-272, 2009.","title":"Characterizing false-name-proof allocation rules in combinatorial auctions","authors":"Taiki Todo, Atsushi Iwasaki, Makoto Yokoo, Yuko Sakurai","year":"2009","venue":"Proceedings of the Eighth International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS-09)","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":14,"raw":"[Todo et al., 2010] Taiki Todo, Atsushi Iwasaki, and Makoto Yokoo. Characterization of revenue monotonicity in combinatorial auctions. In Proceedings of the 2010 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Conference on Intelligent Agent Technology (IAT-10), pages 383-390, 2010.","title":"Characterization of revenue monotonicity in combinatorial auctions","authors":"Taiki Todo, Atsushi Iwasaki, Makoto Yokoo","year":"2010","venue":"Proceedings of the 2010 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Conference on Intelligent Agent Technology (IAT-10)","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":15,"raw":"[Todo et al., 2011a] Taiki Todo, Atsushi Iwasaki, and Makoto Yokoo. False-name-proof mechanism design without money. In Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Sys- tems (AAMAS-11), pages 651-658, 2011.","title":"False-name-proof mechanism design without money","authors":"Todo","year":"2011","venue":"Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS-11)","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":16,"raw":"[Todo et al., 2011b] Taiki Todo, Runcong Li, Xuemei Hu, Takayuki Mouri, Atsushi Iwasaki, and Makoto Yokoo. Generalizing envy-freeness toward group of agents. In Proceedings of the 22nd International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-11), pages 386-392, 2011.","title":"Generalizing envy-freeness toward group of agents","authors":"Todo","year":"2011","venue":"Proceedings of the 22nd International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-11)","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":"/proceedings/2011/73"},{"position":17,"raw":"[Todo et al., 2012] Taiki Todo, Takayuki Mouri, Atsushi Iwasaki, and Makoto Yokoo. False-name-proofness in on- line mechanisms. In Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Sys- tems (AAMAS-12), pages 753-762, 2012.","title":"False-name-proofness in online mechanisms","authors":"Taiki Todo, Takayuki Mouri, Atsushi Iwasaki, Makoto Yokoo","year":"2012","venue":"Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS-12)","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":18,"raw":"[Todo et al., 2014] Taiki Todo, Haixin Sun, and Makoto Yokoo. Strategyproof exchange with multiple private en- dowments. In Proceedings of the 28th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-14), pages 805-811, 2014.","title":"Strategyproof exchange with multiple private endowments","authors":"Todo","year":"2014","venue":"Proceedings of the 28th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-14)","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":19,"raw":"[Todo et al., 2019] Taiki Todo, Atsushi Iwasaki, and Makoto Yokoo. Competitive auctions and envy-freeness for group of agents. In Proceedings of the 25th International Com- puting and Combinatorics Conference (COCOON-19), pages 541-553, 2019.","title":"Competitive auctions and envy-freeness for group of agents","authors":"Taiki Todo, Atsushi Iwasaki, Makoto Yokoo","year":"2019","venue":"Proceedings of the 25th International Computing and Combinatorics Conference (COCOON-19)","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":20,"raw":"[Todo et al., 2020] Taiki Todo, Nodoka Okada, and Makoto Yokoo. False-name-proof facility location on discrete structures. To appear in Proceedings of the 24th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence (ECAI-20), 2020.","title":"False-name-proof facility location on discrete structures","authors":"Todo","year":"2020","venue":"Proceedings of the 24th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence (ECAI-20)","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":21,"raw":"[Tsuruta et al., 2015] Shunsuke Tsuruta, Masaaki Oka, Taiki Todo, Yuko Sakurai, and Makoto Yokoo. Fairness and false-name manipulations in randomized cake cutting. In Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on Au- tonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS-15), pages 909-917, 2015.","title":"Fairness and false-name manipulations in randomized cake cutting","authors":"Shunsuke Tsuruta, Masaaki Oka, Taiki Todo, Yuko Sakurai, Makoto Yokoo","year":"2015","venue":"Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS-15)","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":22,"raw":"[Wada et al., 2018] Yuho Wada, Tomohiro Ono, Taiki Todo, and Makoto Yokoo. Facility location with variable and dynamic populations. In Proceedings of the 17th Interna- tional Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS-18), pages 336-344, 2018.","title":"Facility location with variable and dynamic populations","authors":"Yuho Wada, Tomohiro Ono, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo","year":"2018","venue":"Proceedings of the 17th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS-18)","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":23,"raw":"[Yokoo et al., 2004] Makoto Yokoo, Yuko Sakurai, and Shi- geo Matsubara. The effect of false-name bids in combi- natorial auctions: New fraud in internet auctions. Games and Economic Behavior, 46(1):174-188, 2004.","title":"The effect of false-name bids in combinatorial auctions: New fraud in internet auctions","authors":"Makoto Yokoo, Yuko Sakurai, Shigeo Matsubara","year":"2004","venue":"Games and Economic Behavior","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null}],"license_note":"Copyright International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence."}