{"type":"ScholarlyArticle","title":"Uniform Welfare Guarantees Under Identical Subadditive Valuations","authors":[{"name":"Siddharth Barman","slug":"siddharth-barman","given":"Siddharth","family":"Barman","affiliation":"Indian Institute of Science"},{"name":"Ranjani G. Sundaram","slug":"ranjani-g-sundaram","given":"Ranjani G.","family":"Sundaram","affiliation":"Chennai Mathematical Institute"}],"abstract":"We study the problem of allocating indivisible goods among agents that have an identical subadditive valuation over the goods. The extent of fair- ness and efficiency of allocations is measured by the generalized means of the values that the alloca- tions generate among the agents. Parameterized by an exponent term p, generalized-mean welfares en- compass multiple well-studied objectives, such as social welfare, Nash social welfare, and egalitarian welfare. We establish that, under identical subadditive valu- ations and in the demand oracle model, one can efficiently find a single allocation that approximates the optimal generalized-mean welfare—to within a factor of 40—uniformly for all p ∈ (−∞,1]. Hence, by way of a constant-factor approximation algorithm, we obtain novel results for maximizing Nash social welfare and egalitarian welfare for identical subadditive valuations.","doi":"10.24963/ijcai.2020/7","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2020/7","pdf":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2020/0007.pdf","markdown":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2020/7.md","bibtex":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2020/bibtex/7","volume":{"slug":"2020","title":"Proceedings of the Twenty-Ninth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence","short_title":"IJCAI 2020","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2020/","year":2020,"location":"Yokohama","dates":"January 2021 (postponed from 11-17 July 2020)","editors":"Christian Bessiere","isbn":"978-0-9992411-6-5","publisher":"International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization","doi_prefix":"10.24963/ijcai.2020"},"section":"Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems","track":"Main track","number":7,"pages":{"first":46,"last":52},"keywords":["Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Algorithmic Game Theory","Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Computational Social Choice"],"videos":[{"label":"Video","url":"https://videos.ijcai20.org/24949/file_24949.m3u8","length_sec":286,"provider":"hls"}],"references":[{"position":1,"raw":"[Annamalai et al., 2017] Chidambaram Annamalai, Christos Kalaitzis, and Ola Svensson. 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