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I give here a survey of works along this line.","doi":"10.24963/ijcai.2020/680","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2020/680","pdf":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2020/0680.pdf","markdown":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2020/680.md","bibtex":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2020/bibtex/680","volume":{"slug":"2020","title":"Proceedings of the Twenty-Ninth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence","short_title":"IJCAI 2020","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2020/","year":2020,"location":"Yokohama","dates":"January 2021 (postponed from 11-17 July 2020)","editors":"Christian Bessiere","isbn":"978-0-9992411-6-5","publisher":"International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization","doi_prefix":"10.24963/ijcai.2020"},"section":"Survey track","track":"Survey track","number":680,"pages":{"first":4885,"last":4891},"keywords":["Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: general"],"videos":[],"references":[{"position":1,"raw":"[Ayadi et al., 2019] M. Ayadi, N. 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