{"type":"ScholarlyArticle","title":"Almost Group Envy-free Allocation of Indivisible Goods and Chores","authors":[{"name":"Haris Aziz","slug":"haris-aziz","given":"Haris","family":"Aziz","affiliation":"UNSW Sydney"},{"name":"Simon Rey","slug":"simon-rey","given":"Simon","family":"Rey","affiliation":"Institute for Logic, Language and Computation (ILLC) , University of Amsterdam; Data61 CSIRO"}],"abstract":"We consider a multi-agent resource allocation setting in which an agent's utility may decrease or increase when an item is allocated. We take the group envy-freeness concept that is well-established in the literature and present stronger and relaxed versions that are especially suitable for the allocation of indivisible items. Of particular interest is a concept called group envy-freeness up to one item (GEF1). We then present a clear taxonomy of the fairness concepts. We study which fairness concepts guarantee the existence of a fair allocation under which preference domain. For two natural classes of additive utilities, we design polynomial-time algorithms to compute a GEF1 allocation. We also prove that checking whether a given allocation satisfies GEF1 is coNP-complete when there are either only goods, only chores or both.","doi":"10.24963/ijcai.2020/6","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2020/6","pdf":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2020/0006.pdf","markdown":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2020/6.md","bibtex":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2020/bibtex/6","volume":{"slug":"2020","title":"Proceedings of the Twenty-Ninth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence","short_title":"IJCAI 2020","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2020/","year":2020,"location":"Yokohama","dates":"January 2021 (postponed from 11-17 July 2020)","editors":"Christian Bessiere","isbn":"978-0-9992411-6-5","publisher":"International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization","doi_prefix":"10.24963/ijcai.2020"},"section":"Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems","track":"Main track","number":6,"pages":{"first":39,"last":45},"keywords":["Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Computational Social Choice","Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Resource Allocation"],"videos":[{"label":"Video","url":"https://videos.ijcai20.org/24350/file_24350.m3u8","length_sec":294,"provider":"hls"}],"references":[{"position":1,"raw":"[Aleksandrov and Walsh, 2018] M. 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