{"type":"ScholarlyArticle","title":"Sybil-proof Answer Querying Mechanism","authors":[{"name":"Yao Zhang","slug":"yao-zhang","given":"Yao","family":"Zhang","affiliation":"Shanghai Engineering Research Center of Intelligent Vision and Imaging , ShanghaiTech University"},{"name":"Xiuzhen Zhang","slug":"xiuzhen-zhang","given":"Xiuzhen","family":"Zhang","affiliation":"Shanghai Engineering Research Center of Intelligent Vision and Imaging , ShanghaiTech University"},{"name":"Dengji Zhao","slug":"dengji-zhao","given":"Dengji","family":"Zhao","affiliation":"Shanghai Engineering Research Center of Intelligent Vision and Imaging , ShanghaiTech University"}],"abstract":"We study a question answering problem on a social network, where a requester is seeking an answer from the agents on the network. The goal is to design reward mechanisms to incentivize the agents to propagate the requester's query to their neighbours if they don't have the answer. Existing mechanisms are vulnerable to Sybil-attacks, i.e., an agent may get more reward by creating fake identities. Hence, we combat this problem by first proving some impossibility results to resolve Sybil-attacks and then characterizing a class of mechanisms which satisfy Sybil-proofness (prevents Sybil-attacks) as well as other desirable properties. Except for Sybil-proofness, we also consider cost minimization for the requester and agents' collusions.","doi":"10.24963/ijcai.2020/59","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2020/59","pdf":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2020/0059.pdf","markdown":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2020/59.md","bibtex":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2020/bibtex/59","volume":{"slug":"2020","title":"Proceedings of the Twenty-Ninth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence","short_title":"IJCAI 2020","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2020/","year":2020,"location":"Yokohama","dates":"January 2021 (postponed from 11-17 July 2020)","editors":"Christian Bessiere","isbn":"978-0-9992411-6-5","publisher":"International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization","doi_prefix":"10.24963/ijcai.2020"},"section":"Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems","track":"Main track","number":59,"pages":{"first":422,"last":428},"keywords":["Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Algorithmic Game Theory","Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Economic Paradigms, Auctions and Market-Based Systems","Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Noncooperative Games"],"videos":[{"label":"Video","url":"https://videos.ijcai20.org/24628/file_24628.m3u8","length_sec":279,"provider":"hls"}],"references":[{"position":1,"raw":"[Arcaute et al., 2007] Esteban Arcaute, Adam Kirsch, Ravi Kumar, David Liben-Nowell, and Sergei Vassilvitskii. 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