{"type":"ScholarlyArticle","title":"Budgeted Facility Location Games with Strategic Facilities","authors":[{"name":"Minming Li","slug":"minming-li","given":"Minming","family":"Li","affiliation":"Department of Computer Science , City University of Hong Kong"},{"name":"Chenhao Wang","slug":"chenhao-wang","given":"Chenhao","family":"Wang","affiliation":"Department of Computer Science , City University of Hong Kong; Academy of Mathematics and Systems Science , Chinese Academy of Sciences; School of Mathematical Sciences , University of Chinese Academy of Sciences"},{"name":"Mengqi Zhang","slug":"mengqi-zhang","given":"Mengqi","family":"Zhang","affiliation":"Academy of Mathematics and Systems Science , Chinese Academy of Sciences; School of Mathematical Sciences , University of Chinese Academy of Sciences"}],"abstract":"This paper studies the facility location games with payments, where facilities are strategic players. In the game, customers and facilities are located at publicly known locations on a line segment. Each selfish facility has an opening-cost as her private information, and she may strategically report it. Upon receiving the reports, the government uses a mechanism to select some facilities to open and pay to them. The cost/utility of each customer depends on the distance to the nearest opened facility. Under a given budget B, which constrains the total payment, we derive upper and lower bounds on the approximation ratios of truthful budget feasible mechanisms for four utilitarian and egalitarian objectives, and study the case when augmented budget is allowed.","doi":"10.24963/ijcai.2020/56","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2020/56","pdf":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2020/0056.pdf","markdown":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2020/56.md","bibtex":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2020/bibtex/56","volume":{"slug":"2020","title":"Proceedings of the Twenty-Ninth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence","short_title":"IJCAI 2020","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2020/","year":2020,"location":"Yokohama","dates":"January 2021 (postponed from 11-17 July 2020)","editors":"Christian Bessiere","isbn":"978-0-9992411-6-5","publisher":"International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization","doi_prefix":"10.24963/ijcai.2020"},"section":"Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems","track":"Main track","number":56,"pages":{"first":400,"last":406},"keywords":["Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Algorithmic Game Theory","Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Computational Social Choice"],"videos":[{"label":"Video","url":"https://videos.ijcai20.org/24578/file_24578.m3u8","length_sec":255,"provider":"hls"}],"references":[{"position":1,"raw":"[Amanatidis et al., 2017] Georgios Amanatidis, Georgios Birmpas, and Evangelos Markakis. 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