{"type":"ScholarlyArticle","title":"When to Follow the Tip: Security Games with Strategic Informants","authors":[{"name":"Weiran Shen","slug":"weiran-shen","given":"Weiran","family":"Shen","affiliation":"Carnegie Mellon University"},{"name":"Weizhe Chen","slug":"weizhe-chen","given":"Weizhe","family":"Chen","affiliation":"Shanghai Jiao Tong University"},{"name":"Taoan Huang","slug":"taoan-huang","given":"Taoan","family":"Huang","affiliation":"University of Southern California"},{"name":"Rohit Singh","slug":"rohit-singh","given":"Rohit","family":"Singh","affiliation":"World Wide Fund for Nature"},{"name":"Fei Fang","slug":"fei-fang","given":"Fei","family":"Fang","affiliation":"Carnegie Mellon University"}],"abstract":"Although security games have attracted intensive research attention over the past years, few existing works consider how information from local communities would affect the game. In this paper, we introduce a new player -- a strategic informant, who can observe and report upcoming attacks -- to the defender-attacker security game setting. Characterized by a private type, the informant has his utility structure that leads to his strategic behaviors. We model the game as a 3-player extensive-form game and propose a novel solution concept of Strong Stackelberg-perfect Bayesian equilibrium. To compute the optimal defender strategy, we first show that although the informant can have infinitely many types in general, the optimal defense plan can only include a finite (exponential) number of different patrol strategies. We then prove that there exists a defense plan with only a linear number of patrol strategies that achieve the optimal defender's utility, which significantly reduces the computational burden and allows us to solve the game in polynomial time using linear programming. Finally, we conduct extensive experiments to show the effect of the strategic informant and demonstrate the effectiveness of our algorithm.","doi":"10.24963/ijcai.2020/52","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2020/52","pdf":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2020/0052.pdf","markdown":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2020/52.md","bibtex":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2020/bibtex/52","volume":{"slug":"2020","title":"Proceedings of the Twenty-Ninth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence","short_title":"IJCAI 2020","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2020/","year":2020,"location":"Yokohama","dates":"January 2021 (postponed from 11-17 July 2020)","editors":"Christian Bessiere","isbn":"978-0-9992411-6-5","publisher":"International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization","doi_prefix":"10.24963/ijcai.2020"},"section":"Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems","track":"Main track","number":52,"pages":{"first":371,"last":377},"keywords":["Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Noncooperative Games","Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Algorithmic Game Theory"],"videos":[{"label":"Video","url":"https://videos.ijcai20.org/24782/file_24782.m3u8","length_sec":287,"provider":"hls"}],"references":[{"position":1,"raw":"[Basilico et al., 2016] Nicola Basilico, Stefano Coniglio, and Nicola Gatti. 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