{"type":"ScholarlyArticle","title":"Strategyproof Mechanism for Two Heterogeneous Facilities with Constant Approximation Ratio","authors":[{"name":"Minming Li","slug":"minming-li","given":"Minming","family":"Li","affiliation":"City University of Hong Kong , Hong Kong , China"},{"name":"Pinyan Lu","slug":"pinyan-lu","given":"Pinyan","family":"Lu","affiliation":"ITCS , Shanghai University of Finance and Economics , Shanghai , China"},{"name":"Yuhao Yao","slug":"yuhao-yao","given":"Yuhao","family":"Yao","affiliation":"University of Chinese Academy of Sciences , Beijing , China"},{"name":"Jialin Zhang","slug":"jialin-zhang","given":"Jialin","family":"Zhang","affiliation":"University of Chinese Academy of Sciences , Beijing , China; Institute of Computing Technology , Chinese Academy of Sciences , Beijing , China"}],"abstract":"In this paper, we study the two-facility location game with optional preference where the acceptable set of facilities for each agent could be different and an agent's cost is his distance to the closest facility within his acceptable set. The objective is to minimize the total cost of all agents while achieving strategyproofness. For general metrics, we design a deterministic strategyproof mechanism for the problem with approximation ratio of 1+2alpha, where alpha is the approximation ratio of the optimization version. In particular, for the setting on a line, we improve the earlier best ratio of n/2+1 to a ratio of 2.75.","doi":"10.24963/ijcai.2020/34","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2020/34","pdf":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2020/0034.pdf","markdown":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2020/34.md","bibtex":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2020/bibtex/34","volume":{"slug":"2020","title":"Proceedings of the Twenty-Ninth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence","short_title":"IJCAI 2020","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2020/","year":2020,"location":"Yokohama","dates":"January 2021 (postponed from 11-17 July 2020)","editors":"Christian Bessiere","isbn":"978-0-9992411-6-5","publisher":"International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization","doi_prefix":"10.24963/ijcai.2020"},"section":"Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems","track":"Main track","number":34,"pages":{"first":238,"last":245},"keywords":["Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Algorithmic Game Theory","Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Computational Social Choice"],"videos":[{"label":"Video","url":"https://videos.ijcai20.org/25160/file_25160.m3u8","length_sec":253,"provider":"hls"}],"references":[{"position":1,"raw":"[Alon et al., 2010] Noga Alon, Michal Feldman, Ariel D. 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