{"type":"ScholarlyArticle","title":"Synthesis of Deceptive Strategies in Reachability Games with Action Misperception","authors":[{"name":"Abhishek N. Kulkarni","slug":"abhishek-n-kulkarni","given":"Abhishek N.","family":"Kulkarni","affiliation":"Worcester Polytechnic Institute , Worcester , USA"},{"name":"Jie Fu","slug":"jie-fu","given":"Jie","family":"Fu","affiliation":"Worcester Polytechnic Institute , Worcester , USA"}],"abstract":"We consider a class of two-player turn-based zero-sum games on graphs with reachability objectives, known as reachability games, where the objective of Player 1 (P1) is to reach a set of goal states, and that of Player 2 (P2) is to prevent this. In particular, we consider the case where the players have asymmetric information about each other's action capabilities: P2 starts with an incomplete information (misperception) about P1's action set, and updates the misperception when P1 uses an action previously unknown to P2. When P1 is made aware of P2's misperception, the key question is whether P1 can control P2's perception so as to deceive P2 into selecting actions to P1's advantage? To answer this question, we introduce a dynamic hypergame model to capture the reachability game with evolving misperception of P2. Then, we present a fixed-point algorithm to compute the deceptive winning region and strategy for P1 under almost-sure winning condition. Finally, we show that the synthesized deceptive winning strategy is at least as powerful as the (non-deceptive) winning strategy in the game in which P1 does not account for P2's misperception. We illustrate our algorithm using a robot motion planning in an adversarial environment.","doi":"10.24963/ijcai.2020/31","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2020/31","pdf":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2020/0031.pdf","markdown":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2020/31.md","bibtex":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2020/bibtex/31","volume":{"slug":"2020","title":"Proceedings of the Twenty-Ninth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence","short_title":"IJCAI 2020","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2020/","year":2020,"location":"Yokohama","dates":"January 2021 (postponed from 11-17 July 2020)","editors":"Christian Bessiere","isbn":"978-0-9992411-6-5","publisher":"International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization","doi_prefix":"10.24963/ijcai.2020"},"section":"Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems","track":"Main track","number":31,"pages":{"first":217,"last":223},"keywords":["Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Algorithmic Game Theory","Knowledge Representation and Reasoning: Reasoning about Knowledge and Belief","Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Formal Verification, Validation and Synthesis"],"videos":[{"label":"Video","url":"https://videos.ijcai20.org/25249/file_25249.m3u8","length_sec":300,"provider":"hls"}],"references":[{"position":1,"raw":"[Baier and Katoen, 2008] Christel Baier and Joost-Pieter Katoen. 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