{"type":"ScholarlyArticle","title":"Social Ranking Manipulability for the CP-Majority, Banzhaf and Lexicographic Excellence Solutions","authors":[{"name":"Tahar Allouche","slug":"tahar-allouche","given":"Tahar","family":"Allouche","affiliation":"ENSTA-Paris , Institut Polytechnique de Paris , France"},{"name":"Bruno Escoffier","slug":"bruno-escoffier","given":"Bruno","family":"Escoffier","affiliation":"Sorbonne Université , CNRS , LIP6 , F-75005 Paris , France; Institut Universitaire de France , France"},{"name":"Stefano Moretti","slug":"stefano-moretti","given":"Stefano","family":"Moretti","affiliation":"Université Paris Dauphine , PSL Research University , CNRS , Lamsade , 75016 Paris , France"},{"name":"Meltem Öztürk","slug":"meltem-ozturk","given":"Meltem","family":"Öztürk","affiliation":"Université Paris Dauphine , PSL Research University , CNRS , Lamsade , 75016 Paris , France"}],"abstract":"We investigate the issue of manipulability for social ranking rules, where the goal is to rank individuals given the ranking of coalitions formed by them and each individual prefers to reach the highest positions in the social ranking. This problem lies at the intersection of computational social choice and the algorithmic theory of power indices. Different social ranking rules have been recently proposed and studied from an axiomatic point of view. In this paper, we focus on rules representing three classical approaches in social choice theory:  the marginal contribution approach, the lexicographic approach and the (ceteris paribus) majority one. We first consider some particular members of these families analysing their resistance to a malicious behaviour of individuals. Then, we analyze the computational complexity of manipulation, and complete our theoretical results with simulations in order to analyse the manipulation frequencies and to assess the effects of manipulations.","doi":"10.24963/ijcai.2020/3","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2020/3","pdf":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2020/0003.pdf","markdown":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2020/3.md","bibtex":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2020/bibtex/3","volume":{"slug":"2020","title":"Proceedings of the Twenty-Ninth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence","short_title":"IJCAI 2020","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2020/","year":2020,"location":"Yokohama","dates":"January 2021 (postponed from 11-17 July 2020)","editors":"Christian Bessiere","isbn":"978-0-9992411-6-5","publisher":"International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization","doi_prefix":"10.24963/ijcai.2020"},"section":"Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems","track":"Main track","number":3,"pages":{"first":17,"last":23},"keywords":["Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Cooperative Games","Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Computational Social Choice"],"videos":[{"label":"Video","url":"https://videos.ijcai20.org/24331/file_24331.m3u8","length_sec":287,"provider":"hls"}],"references":[{"position":1,"raw":"[Aziz et al., 2011] Haris Aziz, Yoram Bachrach, Edith Elkind, and Mike Paterson. 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