{"type":"ScholarlyArticle","title":"Well-Structured Committees","authors":[{"name":"Sushmita Gupta","slug":"sushmita-gupta","given":"Sushmita","family":"Gupta","affiliation":"National Institute of Science Education and Research (NISER) , HBNI , India"},{"name":"Pallavi Jain","slug":"pallavi-jain","given":"Pallavi","family":"Jain","affiliation":"Ben-Gurion University of the Negev , Israel,"},{"name":"Saket Saurabh","slug":"saket-saurabh","given":"Saket","family":"Saurabh","affiliation":"The Institute of Mathematical Sciences , HBNI , India,; University of Bergen , Norway"}],"abstract":"In the standard model of committee selection, we are given a set of ordinal votes over a set of candidates and a desired committee size, and the task is to select a committee that relates to the given votes.\r\nMotivated by possible interactions and dependencies between candidates, we study a generalization of committee selection in which the candidates are connected via a network and the task is to select a committee that relates to the given votes while also satisfy certain properties with respect to this candidate network. To accommodate certain correspondences to the voter preferences, we consider three standard voting rules (in particular, $k$-Borda, Chamberlin-Courant, and Gehrlein stability); to model different aspects of interactions and dependencies between candidates, we consider two graph properties (in particular, Independent Set and Connectivity). We study the parameterized complexity of the corresponding combinatorial problems and discuss certain implications of our algorithmic results.","doi":"10.24963/ijcai.2020/27","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2020/27","pdf":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2020/0027.pdf","markdown":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2020/27.md","bibtex":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2020/bibtex/27","volume":{"slug":"2020","title":"Proceedings of the Twenty-Ninth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence","short_title":"IJCAI 2020","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2020/","year":2020,"location":"Yokohama","dates":"January 2021 (postponed from 11-17 July 2020)","editors":"Christian Bessiere","isbn":"978-0-9992411-6-5","publisher":"International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization","doi_prefix":"10.24963/ijcai.2020"},"section":"Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems","track":"Main track","number":27,"pages":{"first":189,"last":195},"keywords":["Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Computational Social Choice"],"videos":[{"label":"Video","url":"https://videos.ijcai20.org/25389/file_25389.m3u8","length_sec":258,"provider":"hls"}],"references":[{"position":1,"raw":"[Alon et al., 1995] Noga Alon, Raphael Yuster, and Uri Zwick. 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