{"type":"ScholarlyArticle","title":"Evaluating Approval-Based Multiwinner Voting in Terms of Robustness to Noise","authors":[{"name":"Ioannis Caragiannis","slug":"ioannis-caragiannis","given":"Ioannis","family":"Caragiannis","affiliation":"Department of Computer Engineering and Informatics , University of Patras , 26504 Rion , Greece; Computer Technology Institute \"Diophantus\" , 26504 Rion , Greece"},{"name":"Christos Kaklamanis","slug":"christos-kaklamanis","given":"Christos","family":"Kaklamanis","affiliation":"Department of Computer Engineering and Informatics , University of Patras , 26504 Rion , Greece; Computer Technology Institute \"Diophantus\" , 26504 Rion , Greece"},{"name":"Nikos Karanikolas","slug":"nikos-karanikolas","given":"Nikos","family":"Karanikolas","affiliation":"Department of Computer Engineering and Informatics , University of Patras , 26504 Rion , Greece"},{"name":"George A. Krimpas","slug":"george-a-krimpas","given":"George A.","family":"Krimpas","affiliation":"Department of Computer Engineering and Informatics , University of Patras , 26504 Rion , Greece"}],"abstract":"Approval-based multiwinner voting rules have recently received much attention in the Computational Social Choice literature. Such rules aggregate approval ballots and determine a winning committee of alternatives. To assess effectiveness, we propose to employ new noise models that are specifically tailored for approval votes and committees. These models take as input a ground truth committee and return random approval votes to be thought of as noisy estimates of the ground truth. A minimum robustness requirement for an approval-based multiwinner voting rule is to return the ground truth when applied to profiles with sufficiently many noisy votes. Our results indicate that approval-based multiwinner voting can indeed be robust to reasonable noise. We further refine this finding by presenting a hierarchy of rules in terms of how robust to noise they are.","doi":"10.24963/ijcai.2020/11","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2020/11","pdf":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2020/0011.pdf","markdown":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2020/11.md","bibtex":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2020/bibtex/11","volume":{"slug":"2020","title":"Proceedings of the Twenty-Ninth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence","short_title":"IJCAI 2020","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2020/","year":2020,"location":"Yokohama","dates":"January 2021 (postponed from 11-17 July 2020)","editors":"Christian Bessiere","isbn":"978-0-9992411-6-5","publisher":"International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization","doi_prefix":"10.24963/ijcai.2020"},"section":"Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems","track":"Main track","number":11,"pages":{"first":74,"last":80},"keywords":["Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Voting","Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Computational Social Choice"],"videos":[{"label":"Video","url":"https://videos.ijcai20.org/25085/file_25085.m3u8","length_sec":262,"provider":"hls"}],"references":[{"position":1,"raw":"Arrow, 1951","title":null,"authors":"Arrow","year":"1951","venue":null,"doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":2,"raw":"K. 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