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In addition, we also give fixed-parameter tractability results for these problems with respect to several natural parameters and derive polynomial-time algorithms for certain special cases.","doi":"10.24963/ijcai.2019/90","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2019/90","pdf":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2019/0090.pdf","markdown":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2019/90.md","bibtex":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2019/bibtex/90","volume":{"slug":"2019","title":"Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence","short_title":"IJCAI 2019","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2019/","year":2019,"location":"Macao","dates":"10-16 August 2019","editors":"Sarit Kraus","isbn":"978-0-9992411-4-1","publisher":"International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization","doi_prefix":"10.24963/ijcai.2019"},"section":"Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems","track":"Main track","number":90,"pages":{"first":637,"last":643},"keywords":["Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Algorithmic Game Theory","Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Computational Social Choice"],"videos":[],"references":[{"position":1,"raw":"[Aziz et al., 2015] H. 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