{"type":"ScholarlyArticle","title":"Strategyproof and Approximately Maxmin Fair Share Allocation of Chores","authors":[{"name":"Haris Aziz","slug":"haris-aziz","given":"Haris","family":"Aziz","affiliation":"UNSW Sydney and Data61 CSIRO , Australia"},{"name":"Bo Li","slug":"bo-li","given":"Bo","family":"Li","affiliation":"Department of Computer Science , Stony Brook University , USA"},{"name":"Xiaowei Wu","slug":"xiaowei-wu","given":"Xiaowei","family":"Wu","affiliation":"Faculty of Computer Science , University of Vienna , Austria"}],"abstract":"We initiate the work on fair and strategyproof allocation of indivisible chores. The fairness concept we consider in this paper is maxmin share (MMS) fairness. We consider three previously studied models of information elicited from the agents: the ordinal model, the cardinal model, and the public ranking model in which the ordinal preferences are publicly known. We present both positive and negative results on the level of MMS approximation that can be guaranteed if we require the algorithm to be strategyproof. Our results uncover some interesting contrasts between the approximation ratios achieved for chores versus goods.","doi":"10.24963/ijcai.2019/9","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2019/9","pdf":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2019/0009.pdf","markdown":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2019/9.md","bibtex":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2019/bibtex/9","volume":{"slug":"2019","title":"Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence","short_title":"IJCAI 2019","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2019/","year":2019,"location":"Macao","dates":"10-16 August 2019","editors":"Sarit Kraus","isbn":"978-0-9992411-4-1","publisher":"International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization","doi_prefix":"10.24963/ijcai.2019"},"section":"Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems","track":"Main track","number":9,"pages":{"first":60,"last":66},"keywords":["Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Resource Allocation","Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Computational Social Choice"],"videos":[],"references":[{"position":1,"raw":"[Amanatidis et al., 2015] G. 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