{"type":"ScholarlyArticle","title":"Multi-Population Congestion Games With Incomplete Information","authors":[{"name":"Charlotte Roman","slug":"charlotte-roman","given":"Charlotte","family":"Roman","affiliation":"Department of Mathematics , University of Warwick"},{"name":"Paolo Turrini","slug":"paolo-turrini","given":"Paolo","family":"Turrini","affiliation":"Department of Computer Science , University of Warwick"}],"abstract":"Congestion games have many important applications to systems where only limited knowledge may be available to players. Here we study traffic networks with multiple origin-destination pairs, relaxing the simplifying assumption of agents having complete knowledge of the network structure. We identify a ubiquitous class of networks, i.e., rings, for which we can safely increase the agents’ knowledge without affecting their own overall performance - known as immunity to Informational Braess’ Paradox - closing a gap in the literature. By extension of this performance measure to include the welfare of all agents, i.e., minimisation of social cost, we show that IBP is a widespread phenomenon and no network is immune to it.","doi":"10.24963/ijcai.2019/80","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2019/80","pdf":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2019/0080.pdf","markdown":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2019/80.md","bibtex":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2019/bibtex/80","volume":{"slug":"2019","title":"Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence","short_title":"IJCAI 2019","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2019/","year":2019,"location":"Macao","dates":"10-16 August 2019","editors":"Sarit Kraus","isbn":"978-0-9992411-4-1","publisher":"International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization","doi_prefix":"10.24963/ijcai.2019"},"section":"Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems","track":"Main track","number":80,"pages":{"first":565,"last":571},"keywords":["Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Resource Allocation","Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Noncooperative Games","Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Algorithmic Game Theory"],"videos":[],"references":[{"position":1,"raw":"[Acemoglu et al., 2018] Daron Acemoglu, Ali Makhdoumi, Azarakhsh Malekian, and Asu Ozdaglar. 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