{"type":"ScholarlyArticle","title":"Diffusion and Auction on Graphs","authors":[{"name":"Bin Li","slug":"bin-li","given":"Bin","family":"Li","affiliation":"University of Electronic Science and Technology of China , Chengdu , China"},{"name":"Dong Hao","slug":"dong-hao","given":"Dong","family":"Hao","affiliation":"University of Electronic Science and Technology of China , Chengdu , China"},{"name":"Dengji Zhao","slug":"dengji-zhao","given":"Dengji","family":"Zhao","affiliation":"ShanghaiTech University , Shanghai , China"},{"name":"Makoto Yokoo","slug":"makoto-yokoo","given":"Makoto","family":"Yokoo","affiliation":"Kyushu University , Fukuoka , Japan"}],"abstract":"Auction is the common paradigm for resource allocation which is a fundamental problem in human society. Existing research indicates that the two primary objectives, the seller's revenue and the allocation efficiency, are generally conflicting in auction design. For the first time, we expand the domain of the classic auction to a social graph and formally identify a new class of auction mechanisms on graphs. All mechanisms in this class are incentive-compatible and also promote all buyers to diffuse the auction information to others, whereby both the seller's revenue and the allocation efficiency are significantly improved comparing with the Vickrey auction. It is found that the recently proposed information diffusion mechanism is an extreme case with the lowest revenue in this new class. Our work could potentially inspire a new perspective for the efficient and optimal auction design and could be applied into the prevalent online social and economic networks.","doi":"10.24963/ijcai.2019/62","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2019/62","pdf":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2019/0062.pdf","markdown":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2019/62.md","bibtex":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2019/bibtex/62","volume":{"slug":"2019","title":"Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence","short_title":"IJCAI 2019","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2019/","year":2019,"location":"Macao","dates":"10-16 August 2019","editors":"Sarit Kraus","isbn":"978-0-9992411-4-1","publisher":"International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization","doi_prefix":"10.24963/ijcai.2019"},"section":"Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems","track":"Main track","number":62,"pages":{"first":435,"last":441},"keywords":["Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Algorithmic Game Theory","Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Multi-agent Planning","Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Economic Paradigms, Auctions and Market-Based Systems"],"videos":[],"references":[{"position":1,"raw":"[Belloni et al., 2017] Alexandre Belloni, Changrong Deng, and Saša Pekeč. 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